The Complementarity of Dogmatism and Criticism and Its Function Within Tradition and Revolution: A Debate between Kuhn, Popper, Gadamer, and Blumenberg by Tazelaar, Mark
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
1997 
The Complementarity of Dogmatism and Criticism and Its 
Function Within Tradition and Revolution: A Debate between Kuhn, 
Popper, Gadamer, and Blumenberg 
Mark Tazelaar 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tazelaar, Mark, "The Complementarity of Dogmatism and Criticism and Its Function Within Tradition and 
Revolution: A Debate between Kuhn, Popper, Gadamer, and Blumenberg" (1997). Dissertations. 3667. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3667 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1997 Mark Tazelaar 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF DOGMATISM AND CRITICISM AND ITS 
FUNCTION WITHIN TRADITION AND REVOLUTION: A DEBATE BETWEEN 
KUHN, POPPER, GADAMER, AND BLUMENBERG 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
BY 
MARK TAZELAAR 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
JANUARY 1997 
Copyright by Mark Tazelaar, 1997 
All rights reserved. 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I have appreciated the opportunity to have studied with 
David Ingram, the Director of this dissertation. His 
insights into the issues treated in this paper were always 
well ahead of my own, so that he served as an excellent 
mentor, guiding me in such a way that I could find my own 
path, and my own voice. 
I would like to thank Jim Blachowicz and Hans Seigfried 
for their respective contributions--through excellent 
advice, timely suggestions, and insightful criticisms. 
I would like to thank my in-laws, Hank and Dorothy 
Wiltjer, for their concrete manifestation of love and 
support, especially for their assistance in caring for my 
children--allowing me the time to work. 
I cannot possibly express my love and gratitude to my 
parents, who at every step of the way, throughout my life, 
have always been there for me. 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Barbara, who 
bore the most varied and heaviest burdens throughout the 
time this was written--including giving birth to two 
beautiful daughters. She has taught me so many lessons, 
foremost among which are the meanings of love, sacrifice, 
and commitment--and the joys of life together. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKN"OWLEDGMENTS ............................................ iii 
Chapter 
1. INI'R.ODUCTION ........................................... 1 
2 . REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS ................. 6 
Whom is Kuhn Attacking? 
Objections to Kuhn: Larry Laudan 
The Dynamic of Normal Science 
3. POPPER: BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND ENTHUSIASM ............. 44 
The Legitimacy of Dogmatism in Inquiry 
Refutation as the Conjecture to Stop 
Def ending a Theory 
Aristarchus: A Case Study 
4. GADAMER' S REHABILITATION OF TRADITION ................. 71 
The Dispute over Values 
Gadamer's Analysis of the Structure of Experience 
The Model of Platonic Dialogue 
5. BLUMENBERG'S DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
HERMENEUTICS ......................................... 104 
Gadamer's Understanding of the Classical 
Problems with Gadamer's Model of the Classical 
The Logic of Question and Answer as 
a Process of Reoccupation 
The History of What Led to a Text's Appearance 
Conditions the History of Its Effects 
6. CONCLUSION ........................................... 13 7 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................... 142 
VITA ....................................................... 151 
iv 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Kuhn is renowned for having affirmed both 
dogmatic and revolutionary aspects of scientific inquiry. 
His is a difficult-- and some would say even incoherent--
mix, however. Among the many central achievements of 
science and scientific method that Kuhn's mix purportedly 
threatens to undermine, few are as dear as the idea of 
progress. The questions which get presented to Kuhn are 
typically along the lines of the following: How can 
dogmatism open itself to the kind of revolutionary critique 
which claims to comprise science's most dramatic advances? 
And yet, how can revolutionary critique measure the success 
it claims, if not against a frame of reference which can 
bridge the gap opened by the revolutionary break, and 
thereby offer points of comparison? 
The treatment of Kuhn's philosophy of science that will 
be presented in the first chapter attempts to correct 
certain misconceptions of his position, and prepares the way 
for a clearer statement of the kind of complementarity 
between dogmatism and revolution that can answer the two 
questions just stated above. Ultimately, for Kuhn--and as 
we shall see, for Blumenberg--the affirmation of progress 
requires an affirmation of complementarity between 
revolutionary breaks and tradition continuity. 
We will see that, for Kuhn, the dogmatic side of 
science--normal science--is not inert. Its offer of 
stability incorporates its own distinctive dynamic. Normal 
science is not, therefore, a stable, entrenched mass 
consistently eroded under the pressure of falsification or 
falsifying criticism. It is not simply a target for 
criticism. 
2 
For Kuhn, all of science proceeds by means of a logic 
of provocation and response, and it is within the terms of 
this logic that the nature and function of normal science 
should be understood. The adoption of a paradigm is 
simultaneously the displacement of another. But this choice 
is not simply according to falsificationist standards, but 
also according to the concrete standards imposed by each 
paradigm. Many commentators, as we will see, have missed 
the functional role Kuhn assigns to the previous paradigm 
both in provoking the emergence of a new paradigm, and in 
setting specific standards for what can qualify as a new 
paradigm. 
In chapter two we will learn that Popper, against whom 
Kuhn may seem to be defining his position, also recognizes 
the dogmatism Kuhn has identified. Insofar as he does, he 
too must provide an account of the complementarity between 
dogmatism and criticism. 
Popper interprets the role of dogmatism in inquiry as 
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helping to identify where the power of our accepted theories 
lie. The importance of this identification is that it 
allows for an assessment of the progress achieved through 
revolutions. Popper therefore does affirm that criticism 
remains accountable to the framework it would reject. 
However, as we will see, this very accountability raises 
serious questions about his beliefs in the steady 
availability of "framework-breaking" or "revolutions in 
permanence." 
In chapter three we will see how the hermeneutic 
philosophy of Hans Georg Gadamer clarifies and develops the 
issue of the complementarity between dogmatism and criticism 
by means of his rehabilitation of the idea of tradition. 
Specifically, Gadamer's hermeneutics will allow us to see 
how a "framework" is not simply an obstacle to knowledge, a 
negative condition restricting our gaze, but is also a 
positive, enabling condition which can open us to, and serve 
as a medium for, new experiences--experiences which both 
falsify and confirm various aspects of our framework 
(tradition) . 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, however, for all its virtues in 
support of Kuhn's struggle against Popper's imperative for 
permanent revolution, ultimately fails to provide Kuhn with 
a viable concept of revolution. At best, Gadamer's 
understanding of the complementarity of dogmatism and 
criticism contextualizes that complementarity within a 
reform-oriented (not a revolution-oriented) tradition. But 
Kuhn himself deploys the concept of revolution--and 
decidedly not the concept of reform. 
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In chapter four I will argue that the work of Hans 
Blumenberg underwrites the requisite notion of revolution 
that Kuhn requires. Blumenberg's work, I will suggest, in 
some senses builds upon the hermeneutics of Gadamer. 
Specifically, I will argue that Blumenberg's descriptions of 
a revolutionary text not only assist Kuhn, but develop the 
idea of the "classical" that has been central to Gadamer's 
work, but which has been subjected to much criticism for its 
conservative, and perhaps even reactionary and ideological 
implications. 
Blumenberg will affirm both the logic of provocation 
and response (Kuhn), and the logic of question and answer 
(Gadamer), but develop these in important ways. 
Specifically, he will differentiate these logics (or, 
rather, this logic, since it is actually one) into two 
components: the concept of reoccupation, and the idea that 
the history of what leads up to an event conditions the 
history of that event's effects. By means of this 
differentiation, Blumenberg will both affirm the possibility 
of revolution as well as the requisite stable background 
against which any change must be measured. In short, he 
will establish his own complementarity between dogmatism and 
criticism. 
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Blumenberg's fundamental claim is that revolutions, as 
pathways out of aporetic situations {crisis), do not require 
the shattering of the identity of the dynamic which gave 
rise to the crisis situation--they do not, that is, require 
the shattering of the framework of answer positions to 
pressing questions. This does not mean that the questions 
{much less the answers) remain the same. Instead, new 
determinations of a question are possible by means of 
revolutionary answers {exemplary problem solutions, in 
Kuhn's terms). However--and this is crucial to Blumenberg's 
affirmation of continuity--such novel determinations of the 
questions often conceal the fact that these answers reoccupy 
old question positions. Revolutions, then, for Blumenberg 
{and for Kuhn), succeed when they reoccupy the positions of 
the old framework--not reconfirm them, as Gadamer would have 
it, nor cancel them, as Popper would. 
Finally, I will argue in the conclusion that 
Blumenberg's concept of the reoccupation of the framework of 
answer positions satisfies the conditions for continuity 
against which progress can be identified. 
CHAPTER TWO 
REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS 
The focus of this chapter is a critical examination of 
the innovation most generally recognized as a significant 
contribution by Kuhn to the philosophy of science: the idea 
of normal science. For Kuhn, the rationality of scientific 
revolutions can only be explained on the basis of the 
dynamic represented by normal science. The idea of normal 
science, I will argue, permits Kuhn to modify the idea of 
11 crisis 11 --the context within which revolutions take place. 
This crisis-context is not simply a free forum, without 
operative standards, within which incommensurable paradigms 
fight for the right to impose their own standards and 
compete for hegemony, nor is it a free-for-all in which 
isolated paradigms fail to communicate with another at the 
same time that they compete for attention. 1 Rather, the 
crisis state already emerges with preliminarily operative 
1 Exactly what Kuhn might mean by "paradigm" has been 
the subject of considerable discussion. See, for example, 
Masterman (1970) . By "paradigm" I will generally mean that 
sense specified by Kuhn according to which certain problem 
solutions serve a global normative status (vs. a merely 
local status as the particular solution they are), and 
become exemplary guides for research. It has been suggested 
by Thomas Nickles that this sense is Kuhn's contribution to 
the resolution of the problem of underdetermination 
(Callebaut 1993:52-3). 
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standards borne by the previous dominant paradigm, which 
establish burdens for competing paradigms to meet. 
The chapter consists of three sections. The first 
section is primarily expository, although its purpose is to 
identify precisely whom Kuhn is attacking, since this is not 
as obvious as one might expect. For example, Kuhn's writing 
style creates ambiguities in the presentation of his 
thought, which makes the identification of what is new 
within it more challenging than it need be. His positions, 
for instance, sometimes appear to be more radical or 
innovative than they actually are. His characteristic 
'mincing' of words, on the other hand, makes him appear more 
tentative. My own interpretation of Kuhn understands him to 
be considerably more conservative than his initial 
reception, and some subsequent ones as well, indicated. 
Many of Kuhn's more 'radical' statements about scientific 
method, I will show, appear to be such only because of the 
infallibilist versions of method against which he projects 
his own views. Does Kuhn take seriously the fallibilist 
accounts of scientific method that were already active when 
he wrote The Structure of Scientific Revolutions?2 This is 
the question which concludes the first section of the 
chapter. It will be treated at length only in the second 
chapter. 
2 For example, those of Popper, Lakatos, and Quine--
and, even, those of Peirce and Dewey. 
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The second section of the chapter pits Kuhn against 
Larry Laudan, who clearly believes that Kuhn's position 
falls into relativism. Against that position, Laudan offers 
his own problem-solving approach. Although I think Laudan's 
position misses the mark, I am not setting him up as a straw 
man. Rather, Laudan's misunderstanding of Kuhn's position 
provides the transition to an account of Kuhn's modification 
of the idea of crisis--a modification Laudan clearly misses. 
The final section of the chapter explores in detail 
Kuhn's conception of the dynamic of normal science. The 
general purpose of this section is to highlight precisely 
what is at stake in Kuhn's rejection of Popper's conjecture 
& refutation approach to scientific activity. But more 
specifically, I will attempt to refute those interpretations 
of Kuhn which understand him to be positing paradigms as 
radically discontinuous, isolated monads, spontaneously and 
arbitrarily generated, and having no standards to share 
among others. 3 I will argue that Kuhn rather explicitly 
makes it clear that paradigms arise in response to the 
expectations, achievements, and failures of the old 
paradigm. This will be become important in chapters three 
and four of the dissertation, insofar the imperative--
3 Hans Blumenberg has himself interpreted Kuhn in 
this way, and, in so doing, overlooked one of the most 
promising areas of dialogue between them (Blumenberg 
1983:465--I will provide a full citation of this passage 
later in this chapter. See also Blumenberg 1987:512). The 
development of this dialogue is one of the major aims of 
this paper. 
affirmed by Gadamer and developed by Blumenberg--which 
instructs us to make the other's position as strong as 
possible is identified as being at the heart of the dynamic 
which generates and underwrites scientific revolutions. 
Whom is Kuhn Attacking? 
9 
The groundwork for understanding what is unique to 
Kuhn's position can be prepared by examining the function 
played by anomaly in paradigm evaluation. Kuhn is 
"empiricist" enough to grant that a crucial factor in 
evaluating a paradigm is the existence of anomalies within 
it. For Kuhn, an anomaly is the violation of a paradigm-
induced expectation (Kuhn 1970a:52-3). Kuhn states, 
"Insecurity is generated by the persistent failure of the 
puzzles of normal science to come out as they should" (68) . 
Soon after, he expands on this "insecurity" by introducing 
the idea of "crisis"--"When .... an anomaly comes to seem more 
than just another puzzle of normal science, the transition 
to crisis and to extraordinary science has begun" (82) . 
Anomalies--violations of expectations--are therefore, first, 
a source of insecurity, and second, may become a source of 
crisis. Kuhn is not altogether clear when this transition 
is made, although it is clear that the transition can be 
made for different reasons (82) . For example, a crisis 
state, he says, "is not, let us be clear, a response called 
forth by any and every anomaly .... experience has repeatedly 
shown that, in overwhelming proportion, these discrepancies 
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disappear upon closer scrutiny" (Kuhn, 1977:202). And 
again, "few anomalies resist persistent effort for very 
long" (203). He continues, however, "it may resist, and if 
it does, we may have the beginning of a 'crisis' or 
'abnormal situation' affecting those in whose usual area of 
research the continuing discrepancy lies" (203) . 
Although Kuhn makes his point using terms that have 
special significance for him, his general point is not 
unique: although it is difficult to pin down precisely when 
an anomaly becomes threatening, it is clear that there is 
"no fundamental theoretical innovation in natural science 
whose enunciation has not been preceded by clear 
recognition .... that something was the matter with the theory 
then in vogue" (206) . 
When an anomaly becomes more than a puzzle for normal 
science, the transition to crisis has begun (1970a:82). 
What happens in this transition is that a paradigm, in the 
course of its articulation by means of puzzle-solving, 
undergoes a proliferation of articulations in the face of 
persistent anomalies, manifesting a breakdown in the 
consensus over what exactly the paradigm is (83) . This 
proliferation, together with the crisis that ensues, provide 
sufficient conditions for the emergence of a new paradigm 
(80, 84). However, neither the anomalies nor the crisis 
will lead the scientist to actually abandon a theory "until 
another one is suggested to replace it (Kuhn, 1977:211) ." 
Kuhn here reiterates claims made early in Structure that 
rejection of a paradigm is always based upon more than 
comparison of the paradigm with the world. The initial 
acceptance of a paradigm is always contextualized within a 
competition between paradigms. With this assertion, Kuhn 
directly broaches the problem of paradigm choice. 
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However, Kuhn is immediately faced with a problem. As 
he states 
Like the choice between competing political 
institutions, that between competing paradigms 
proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of 
community life. Because it has that character, the 
choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the 
evaluative procedures characteristic of normal 
science, for these depend in part upon a particular 
paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue ..... The man 
who premises a paradigm when arguing in its defence 
can nonetheless provide a clear exhibit of what 
scientific practice will be like for those who adopt 
the new view of nature. That exhibit can be 
immensely persuasive, often compellingly so. Yet, 
whatever its force, the status of the circular 
argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be 
made logically or even probabilistically for those 
who refuse to step into the circle. The premises 
and values shared by the two parties to a debate 
over paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for 
that. As in political revolutions, so in paradigm 
choice--there is no standard higher than the assent 
of the relevant community. {1970a:94) 
If comparison to the world is a necessary but not the lone 
or sufficient standard by which one judges the acceptability 
of a paradigm, but requires in addition a competition 
between and comparison of paradigmatic alternatives, then 
some standard for judging the competition is in order--what 
Kuhn here calls "evaluative procedures." But Kuhn says that 
the argument in defence of a paradigm cannot compel someone, 
12 
on the basis of logical necessity, to accept that paradigm, 
although the exhibit of what scientific practice will be 
like for those who adopt the new view can often be 
compellingly persuasive. In other words, evaluative 
procedures that would be sufficient to compel a "logically 
necessary" choice are, at best, internal to a paradigm; 
premises and values which are shared externally are 
insufficient to compel such a "logical" choice between 
paradigms. 
The position at which Kuhn is directing his attack is 
an interpretation of the history of science, according to 
which scientific problems have been solved individually in a 
cumulative progression, so that scientific consensus 
concerning an acceptable solution has been relatively quick 
in coming. 4 Kuhn acknowledges the intuition behind this 
interpretation when he states that his own position raises 
"the question of why, in the absence of binding criteria for 
scientific choice, both the number of solved scientific 
problems and the precision of individual problem solutions 
should increase so markedly with the passage of time" (Kuhn, 
1977:320). But Kuhn attempts to answer this question by 
first posing one of his own, and takes as his point of 
4 In Kuhn's mind proponents of the idea of cumulative 
progress might include someone like Popper. See, for 
example, Popper's statements in The Myth of the Framework 
(1994), p. 103. For a contrary view, however, see Lakatos 
(1970:92). In any case, it is important to note that Kuhn 
explicitly identifies the textbooks of science as perhaps 
the most practically effective proponent of the view. 
departure for answering the initial question his answer to 
~ question. 
What ... are the characteristics of a good scientific 
theory? ... First, a theory should be accurate .... 
Second, a theory should be consistent .... Third, it 
should have broad scope .... Fourth, it should be 
simple .... Fifth, a theory should be fruitful of new 
research findings .... Together with others of much 
the same sort, they provide the shared basis for 
theory choice. (Kuhn, 1977:321-2) 
This list comprises a fairly traditional list of the 
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criteria used in evaluating theories, and as such provide no 
real source of contention. Kuhn, however, adds the crucial 
proviso that "individually the criteria are imprecise: 
individuals may legitimately differ about their application 
to concrete cases (322) ." One historical example he 
provides concerns the acceptance of Copernican theory: the 
consistency criterion would have required an unequivocal 
defence of the geocentric tradition. The upshot of the 
answer to the question concerning the characteristics of a 
good scientific theory is that, although all scientists 
might agree on the list of criteria (and even that is 
doubtful, unless the list is kept very short), still the 
relative weights assigned to the criteria might differ from 
individual to individual, as may the application of those 
criteria in concrete cases (335) . 
This argument provides one element in Kuhn's answer to 
the question why the number and precision of scientific 
solutions increase. But the whole explanation requires more 
than reliance on the list of criteria characterizing a good 
scientific theory. 
For that purpose one must go beyond the list of 
shared criteria to characteristics of the 
individµals who make the choice. One must, that is, 
deal with characteristics which vary from one 
scientist to another without thereby in the least 
jeopardizing their adherence to the canons that make 
science scientific. Though such canons do exist and 
should be discoverable, they are not by themselves 
sufficient to determine the decisions of individual 
scientists. For that purpose the shared canons must 
be fleshed out in ways that differ from one 
individual to another (my stress). (1977:324-5) 
Since the set of criteria is itself too indeterminate and 
variable to sufficiently dictate a logically compelling 
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choice, and therefore is no algorithm at all, one must turn 
to the historical record of scientific activity to determine 
how the criteria were appropriated, interpreted, and applied 
in particular cases. What is more, since the set of 
criteria is insufficient, one must, in turning to history, 
uncover the "individual factors" that have--together with 
the criteria--determined the choice of one paradigm over 
another. Affirming this "mixture" of objective and 
subjective factors is, by his own account, among the more 
revolutionary features of Kuhn's redescription of the image 
of science (1977:325) .5 His reasons for saying this are 
perhaps due to the protracted debate about his version of 
5 Perhaps not simply most revolutionary, but as such 
also most effective. Despite his own reservations about 
their work, Kuhn has been a major influence upon the 
sociology of science, particularly the Edinburgh School, 
represented by Barnes and Bloor. Others within his scope of 
influence--and yet with whom he would seriously disagree--
have been Joseph Rouse and Steve Fuller, to name just a few. 
this mix. It is possible, however, that the debate is due 
more to the ambiguities in his position than to the 
revolutionary features of it. 6 So, for example, Kuhn 
stated in the revised version of £S.R (1970), 
Nothing about that relatively familiar thesis [that 
theory choice is not simply a matter of deductive 
proof] implies either that there are no good reasons 
for being persuaded or that those reasons are not 
ultimately decisive for the group. Nor does it even 
imply that the reasons for choice are different from 
those usually listed by philosophers of science: 
accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like. 
What it should suggest, however, is that such 
reasons function as values and that they can thus be 
differently applied, individually and collectively, 
by men who concur in honoring them. If two men 
disagree, for example, about the relative 
fruitfulness of their theories, or if they agree 
about that but disagree about the relative 
importance of fruitfulness and, say scope in 
reaching a choice, neither can be convicted of a 
mistake. Nor is either being unscientific. There 
is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no 
systematic decision procedure which, properly 
applied, must lead each individual in the group to 
the same decision. (1970a:199-200) 
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Since the time he made this statement Kuhn has been at pains 
to stress that his identification of subjective factors in 
theory-choice should not be understood in a way that opposes 
"subjective" to "judgmental," such that the former would 
mean: factors which could not be subjected to dialogue 
(1977:337). As he states, there are good reasons for a 
decision, and these reasons may be no different than those 
already identified by philosophers of science. Kuhn only 
6 Cf. the collection of essays gathered under the 
title Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre 
Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970). 
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claims that these reasons, or criteria, must not be 
understood to function as "rules" which can be 
algorithmically applied in the self-same way. Their 
application, therefore, does not "prove" the judgment or 
choice being made. Rather, these criteria are values which 
can only "influence" the choice of one paradigm over another 
(331) . They are ways of establishing and distributing 
burdens of proof. As values, their application may be 
ambiguous, but not without reason, and certainly not on that 
account arbitrary or irrational (Kuhn 1970b:262). 
One might wonder here precisely how far Kuhn intends 
to depart from f allibilist understandings of scientific 
method. Kuhn is not clear about whom he has in mind when he 
speaks of a neutral algorithm that is logically compelling. 
If Kuhn is disparaging only those for whom a scientific 
method could be infallibly applied, then this criticism 
leaves Popper, Lakatos, Quine, (etc.) unscathed. 7 For 
example, Kuhn's antagonists are precisely IlQt. the thinkers 
just mentioned when he states the following: 
Before the group accepts it, a new theory has been 
tested over time by the research of a number of men, 
some working within it, others within its 
traditional rival. Such a mode of development, 
however, requires a decision process which permits 
rational men to disagree, and such disagreement 
7 Once again, Popper explicitly denies that he is an 
infallibilist (Popper 1974:28). Perhaps equally important 
is a point I will develop in the next chapter: For Popper 
there is room for debate in science--its activities do not 
simply consist of conjectures and the testing of 
conjectures. 
would be barred by the shared algorithm which 
philosophers have generally sought. If it were at 
hand, all conforming scientists would make the same 
decision at the same time. With standards for 
acceptance set too low, they would move from one 
attractive global viewpoint to another, never giving 
traditional theory an opportunity to supply 
equivalent attractions. With standards set higher, 
no one satisfying the criterion of rationality would 
be inclined to try out the new theory, to articulate 
it in ways which showed its fruitfulness or 
displayed its accuracy and scope .... What from one 
viewpoint may seem the looseness and imperfection of 
choice criteria conceived as rules may, when the 
same criteria are seen as values, appear as 
indispensable means of spreading the risk which the 
introduction of support of novelty always entails. 
(1977:322) 
By means of this 'defense' Kuhn claims that his position 
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concerning the status of these criteria as values, far from 
leading to the disintegration of the scientific enterprise, 
actually guarantees the viability of scientific activity. 
Given that new theories have generally been accepted only 
after considerable lengths of time and testing, Kuhn argues 
that this state of affairs should not be cause for concern. 
Kuhn in fact is arguing for an understanding of the 
decision-making procedures of science which does justice to 
the history of scientific activity--that is, one which does 
not turn the majority of our scientific ancestors into less 
rational creatures than we claim ourselves to be. There is 
no need to presuppose the existence of a neutral, permanent 
and objective algorithm for paradigm choice in order to make 
scientific activity appear rational. In fact, its 
imposition would actually make the vast majority of cases in 
the history of scientific achievement appear irrational. 
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Were we to impose more stringent standards upon scientific 
activity, then no scientific novelty could have survived the 
test of such standards, since no scientific novelty has ever 
unambiguously met every criteria irrunediately. Similarly, 
Kuhn argues that the standards could not be set too low--
which is certainly one of the objections critics raise 
against his own position--since that would permit a constant 
proliferation of theories between which one could not, in a 
non-arbitrary way, choose. In short, Kuhn is aiming for a 
middle ground, in which judgment, as the application of 
shared values, is primary. 8 
This middle ground, however, is occupied by a number 
of thinkers. When Kuhn describes the adherents of an 
algorithm as being those for whom no rational disagreement 
is possible, and for whom every scientific decision would 
have to be made at the same time, then he would find no such 
adherents among the thinkers listed above. Kuhn, does 
believe he is attacking Popper, insofar as he appears to 
believe that the following can fairly be attributed to 
Popper: 
a) Popper is, or can be treated as, a naive 
8 I will take up this issue not only in the following 
section, but also at some length in the third chapter. At 
that point we will see that Richard J. Bernstein has drawn 
some interesting parallels between Kuhn's understanding of 
judgment and the Aristotelian understanding of phronesis. 
This parallel itself, furthermore, introduces the 
contribution of Gadamer to the discussion. The upshot of 
the parallels will be a better understanding of the role of 
tradition {and dogmatism) in scientific activity. 
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falsificationist (Kuhn, 1970b:14); 
b) Popper believes that a falsified theory is not or 
cannot be used in scientific practice or in the search for a 
new theory (Kuhn, 1980:191); or, 
c) Popper believes that scientists do or must act as 
though they were in a state of nature or epistemically 
original position (Callebaut, 1993:301). 
I will argue in the next chapter that none of these 
positions can, in fact, be attributed to Popper. 
Objections to Kuhn: Larry Laudan 
Consideration of Laudan's critique in this section 
foreshadows the analysis that will take place in Chapter 
Three, under the heading, "The Dispute Over Values." 
Laudan's main criticism is that Kuhn's position underwrites 
revolution as the breakdown of consensus, without explaining 
either how such consensus can be re-established or how the 
revolution can be understood as progressive. In Chapter 
Three we will see John Caputo make a similar point--though 
he does not by these means denigrate Kuhn, but rather links 
him to Derrida. On this reading, revolution is the 
perpetual dissolution of normal science into a state of 
anarchy, for which state shared values are ineffective in 
arbitrating judgments between theories. I will argue there 
that this completely overlooks two of the more obvious 
claims made by Kuhn: that values are not ineffective during 
revolutions, and that dogmatism and revolution must be seen 
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in their complementarity, not as isolatable episodes. 
Kuhn's worry with Caputo's understanding of scientific 
revolution, I will suggest, is the same worry Laudan 
expresses with respect to Kuhn: this understanding of 
revolution only underscores the impotence of revolutions--
their perpetual and mutual cancellation--rather than their 
power. The potency of any revolution lies in its ability to 
recover the "middle ground," where, as I said above, 
judgment is primary. 
The position that Kuhn carves out in this middle 
ground as being characteristic of scientific activity is 
attacked by Larry Laudan, who attempts to uncover the 
relativistic and incoherent aspects of Kuhn's position. In 
this regard he focuses on the following statements made by 
Kuhn: 
Lifelong resistance [to a new theory] ... is not a 
violation of scientific standards .... Though the 
historian can always find men--Priestly, for 
instance-- who were unreasonable to resist for as 
long as they did, he will not find a point at which 
resistance becomes illogical or unscientific 
(1970a:159). 
And similarly, 
The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm 
is a conversion experience that cannot be forced. 
Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose 
productive careers have cormnitted them to an older 
tradition of normal science, is not a violation of 
scientific standards but an index to the nature of 
scientific research itself (151) . 
As far as Laudan is concerned, statements like the 
above smack of sheer relativism. When combined with Kuhn's 
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attempt to characterize the criteria for paradigm choice as 
values rather than rules, these statements actually 
undermine Kuhn's attempt to view history as a resource for 
understanding the nature of scientific activity. Despite 
the fact that Kuhn argues for a place for "objective" 
criteria for theory-choice, Laudan argues, he too strongly 
delimits the sufficiency of their applicability. 
Consequently, he is left without a recourse--other than the 
dubious metaphor of "conversion"--to explain exactly how in 
the histo:ry of science so much consensus has come about 
(Laudan 1984:17-8). Kuhn's theory, in other words, may help 
to explain why disagreement breaks out among scientists, and 
even why such disagreement lasts as long as it does, but his 
theory provides no "mechanism" for consensus formation. 
Consensus, on this view, has been one of the most 
distinctive features of scientific activity. Accounting for 
consensus was actually one of the motivating reasons behind 
Kuhn's introduction of the concept of "paradigm": he does 
provide a picture of science as a consensual activity, which 
is one of the things he means by "normal science." But what 
he does not provide, Laudan claims, is a plausible account 
of the dynamic process by which the crisis state of 
scientific activity is transformed into the consensual state 
of normal science. The reason he cannot provide such a 
picture is because he has, by insisting on the 
inconunensurability of standards governing the choice of 
paradigms, removed any cormnon rational foundation on which 
to shape consensus anew (Laudan, 1984:18) . 9 
As an instance of this, Laudan points to Kuhn's 
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position that different paradigms deal with different 
problems. In attempting to come to grips with the fact that 
in the history of science there has been explanatory loss as 
well as explanatory gain, Kuhn works himself into a position 
in which consensus cannot be explained (Kuhn, 1977:211). 
Kuhn states, 
To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete, 
that two scientific schools disagree about what is a 
problem and what a solution, they will inevitably 
talk through each other when debating the relative 
merits of their respective paradigms. In the 
partially circular arguments that regularly result, 
each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less 
the criteria it dictates for itself and to fall 
short of a few of those dictated by its 
opponent ..... Since no paradigm ever solves all the 
problems it defines and since no two paradigms leave 
all the same problems unsolved, paradigm debates 
always involve the question: Which problems is it 
more significant to have solved? Like the issue of 
competing standards, that question of values can be 
answered only in terms of criteria that lie outside 
of normal science altogether, and it is that 
recourse to external criteria that most obviously 
makes paradigm debates revolutionary (Kuhn, 1970a: 
109-110). 
According to Laudan, this position is rather extreme. Kuhn 
rejects the idea that science is progressive in the sense of 
9 The incormnensurability debate sustains a now 
voluminous primary and secondary literature. Among the 
leading voices in the debate are Davidson (1985), Putnam 
(1981), Feyerabend (1987), and Rorty (1979). Of central 
importance to my own understanding of this debate and its 
relationship to the figures and issues treated in this paper 
are Ingram (1993a, 1993b, 1995) . 
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being cumulative. But in doing so he simultaneously 
denigrates progress into something that can at best only be 
instrumental. 10 He fails to see that there is the 
possibility of deploying the concept of progress in such a 
way that it avoids, on one extreme, the assumption that it 
be cumulative, and on the other extreme, that it be only 
instrumental. 
Laudan believes there is a way between these two 
extremes. He says 
Knowledge of the relative weight or the relative 
number or problems can allow us to specify those 
circumstances under which the growth of knowledge 
can be progressive even when we lose the capacity to 
solve certain problems. (Laudan 1977:150) 
Laudan calls his position a "problem-solving approach" to 
scientific activity. Contrary to Kuhn, Laudan believes that 
one can "weigh" problems to determine their significance. 
One of the most important means to weigh problems is, in 
fact, to categorize much more explicitly than Kuhn has done 
the various "kinds" of anomaly that confront any scientific 
theory. Kuhn, it has been shown, is very general in his 
analysis of anomaly, and is particularly imprecise when it 
comes to determining when exactly an anomaly is or becomes a 
source of crisis. In contrast, Laudan seeks to be 
considerably more specific. Laudan's aim is a "calculus" to 
lO By "instrumental" I believe Laudan intends the 
pejorative sense according to which science would merely 
produce better means, or instruments, for independently 
determined ends. 
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determine the significance of scientific problems. At 
times, this calculus is stated very generally, such as when 
he says 
The overall problem-solving effectiveness of a 
theory is determined by assessing the number and 
importance of the empirical problems which the 
theory solves and deducting therefrom the number and 
importance of the anomalies and conceptual problems 
which the theory generates (Laudan, 1977:68). 
At other times, Laudan makes very specific proposals for a 
calculus (33ff .) . In any case, his essential plea is that 
it must be possible, if we are to affirm the rationality of 
theory-choice, "to indicate at least the differences between 
those anomalies which are disastrous for a theory and those 
which are only a mild embarrassment" (37). 
Does such a calculus hold any promise? On the one 
hand one can say that such a calculus would face problems 
similar to those faced by the utilitarian project of a 
calculus for moral decision-making. 11 Kuhn in fact might 
object that Laudan is assuming much more commensurability 
between theories than is warranted. Would the calculus be a 
neutral instrument for weighing the significance of problems 
across paradigms, or would each paradigm first determine the 
significance of its own problems? That is, do we compare 
paradigms only after we have first--in abstraction from the 
paradigms themselves--"individually" weighed the problems 
within them, or do we compare paradigms after each paradigm 
11 Cf. Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana, 1988), 103. 
has derived the "sum total" of it..s. problem-solving 
effectiveness by it..s. own criteria?12 
Summary 
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The point of this section was that there does seem to 
be some prima facie warrant for the idea that the relative 
significance of problems must be determined. Of course on 
this point Kuhn himself would agree. Laudan's project of 
establishing a calculus is highly questionable, however, 
particularly in light of the problems such projects have 
experienced in the past. The determination of relative 
significance is better accounted for, Kuhn argues, by the 
dynamic of normal science. 
The Dynamic of Normal Science 
The implicit context for the kind of scientific 
activity that has been discussed thus far has been what 
Popper calls "revolutions in permanence," the ideal of which 
is that scientists engage in "perpetual framework-breaking" 
12 This apparently naive question is of some 
importance, for in either case it would be difficult to 
adjudicate the weighing of a problem in a situation such as 
the following: when comparing one-on-one the solutions 
offered to a problem by two competing paradigms, one 
determines that solution A provided by paradigm 1 (Pl) is 
"better"--because more accurate--than solution B provided by 
paradigm 2 (P2). Yet, the importance of solution B in P2 
has significant implications for the acceptance of solutions 
within a completely different paradigm P3. How would one, 
in this example, go about making a determination of the 
weight of the problem to which these two opposing solutions 
were solutions? This question captures Kuhn's point about 
determining the relative value of different criteria such 
as, in this case, accuracy and scope. 
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(Popper, 1970:242). According to Popper, Kuhn suggests, 
"the scientist should try at all times to be a critic and a 
proliferator of alternate theories" (Kuhn, 1970b:243) . 13 
On Kuhn's reading of Popper, proliferation can take place 
without falling prey to paralysis because of the efficacy of 
the principle of falsification. Significant variation and 
difference must be permitted--bold conjecture must be the 
defining mark of the serious scientist. 
Kuhn's own idea of crisis differs significantly from 
this state of affairs. If one were to search for the 
operative standards that determine the significance of 
problems, then one would not conduct that search within a 
context like the one thus far characterized as a crisis-
state. In other words, one does not first determine what 
the significant problems and standards are in the state of 
crisis. In the crisis state, preliminary determinations of 
such signf icance have already been made through the 
processes and products of normal science. This is why Kuhn 
is not satisfied with the characterization of crisis 
provided. It is also why he would not agree to Laudan's 
"calculus" for determining problem-significance. Such 
determinations for Kuhn are not made in abstraction from the 
context of crisis nor ~ after the crisis has arisen. For 
l3 But as we shall see in detail in the next chapter, 
~opper allows for a considerable amount of dogmatism in 
inquiry. His recognition of the need for such dogmatism is 
a primary point in his rejection of the criticism that he is 
a naive falsificationist. 
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that matter, in an assertion Kuhn aims directly at Lakatos, 
such determinations not made only after a research prograrmne 
is in decline, in a period of stagnation, or has ceased to 
produce novelty (Kuhn 1980: 190-1) . 14 
Therefore, for Kuhn, in order to understand the 
context of crisis--and the problems and standards operative 
within it--one must understand the dynamic of normal 
science. The dynamic of normal science, according to Kuhn, 
provides the "special occasions" when the scientist should 
adopt a "revolutionary" attitude. In other words, the 
scientist should not engage in constant framework-breaking, 
but should do so only when the time is right--when a special 
occasion presents itself .15 
The distinction and interaction between normal science 
and the context of crisis, suggested by Kuhn, is intended to 
14 I will develop the implications of this claim at 
the end of this chapter. 
15 The interpretation of Kuhn which pictures one 
period of normal science "breaking off" and being supplanted 
by a period of crisis, which in turn breaks off and is 
supplanted by a new period of normal science, etc., fails to 
recognize that for Kuhn normal science and the crisis-state 
can only be distinguished within the context of a general 
dynamic of scientific activity. Normal science and the 
crisis-state are not self-enclosed 'periods' successive upon 
one another; rather, they are better described as 'ways' of 
doing science, the description of which is not reaucible to 
a relationship of temporal succession upon one another. 
Some temporal succession is identifiable, but only against 
the background of an integrating dynamic. Rouse makes this 
observation in drawing his own comparison of Kuhn with 
Heidegger. According to him, these 'ways' of doing science 
are "moods" or "dispositions," in a Heideggerian sense, of 
the scientific cormnunity (Rouse 1981, 277-8) . 
undermine a conception of crisis which makes of it the 
privileged characteristic of science. Furthermore, it 
elevates the dogmatic element beyond what someone like 
Popper permits. Kuhn describes his insistence on this 
dogmatic element as being "strategic." Popper describes 
Kuhn's kind of dogmatism as dangerous . 16 On the other side 
of this rhetoric, significant differences become manifest. 
For Kuhn, when a theory that satisfies the 
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requirements for being a good theory is made available, "the 
time for steady criticism and theory proliferation has 
passed" (Kuhn 1970b:246). Scientists could continue to 
proliferate theories and question fundamentals, but they 
typically do not. There are two reasons for this, 
representing positive and negative aspects of the dynamic of 
normal science. First, if scientists commit themselves to a 
theory, they gain the opportunity to "explore nature to an 
esoteric depth and detail otherwise unimaginable" (Kuhn 
1970b:247). Second, they can indulge their 'dogmatism' in 
the confidence that it will actually function ultimately to 
reveal the weaknesses in the theory and thereby set the 
stage for future revolution. 
Of course this preliminary description of normal 
science raises the question not simply of what allows the 
16 Note that the title of his critical response to 
Kuhn, "Normal Science and Its Dangers" (Popper 1970), is 
obviously intended to echo his famous book, The ()_pen Society 
and Its Enemies. 
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scientist to stop questioning fundamentals and stop 
proliferating theories, but more importantly what rationally 
motivates the scientist to do so? Kuhn admits that 
scientists could try to engage in such activities, but that 
they could not engage in them constantly or permanently 
(Kuhn 1970b:242-3). Of course, many philosophers of science 
would agree with this. 17 The question is: where does one 
go from that point? 
In one sense, that scientists do not engage in 
constant proliferation is, for Kuhn, an individ.ual decision 
based upon the freedom the scientist enjoys; in another 
sense, that scientists do not engage in such activities in 
the face of an available theory is a characteristic 
temperament of scientists reflective of community structure 
and its patterns of education. Neither of these senses, 
however, justifies the claim that they should not engage in 
"revolutions in permanence." 
The motivations Kuhn uncovers are primarily 
psychological and sociological--for example, he points to 
various dispositions towards "risk-taking." These 
dispositions are molded through a community pattern of 
education that also determines the range of standards of 
tolerance. What are the reasons behind the determination of 
17 This issue will be discussed more fully in the 
next chapter. Once again, the degree of difference between 
Kuhn and someone like Popper is not as wide as is sometimes 
suggested. 
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this range? The question arises whether epistemic 
motivations on the part of an individual scientist are 
actually legislated by the community--which may be fine and 
good. But is this legislation itself epistemically 
motivated? For example, community self-preservation and 
maintenance of professional identity are important values, 
but are they the fundamental standards legislating 
scientific research? When Kuhn speaks of the "ideological" 
nature of being alert to anomaly, one can justifiably 
suspect that he is more in sympathy with the Edinburgh 
school of the sociology of science than he would care to 
admit (Kuhn, 1970b:248). Is he in fact sliding down the 
slippery slope? 
Furthermore, because Kuhn restricts the efficacy of 
testability in practice (e.g. falsifiability), particularly 
during those crisis states when theories are proliferating, 
his understanding of scientific activity threatens to 
undermine its rationality. Kuhn tries to mitigate this 
threat by disclosing the conditions necessary for a rational 
application of this principle. Unfortunately, the 
conditions disclosed seem to be too ideological to allow one 
to assign a rational motivation to such applications. 
For example, Kuhn speaks of a "considerable resistance 
to paradigm change" within the practice of normal science, 
due to the fact that such practice has become "increasingly 
rigid." Resistors and innovators will "inevitably talk 
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through each other," so that a change in belief or 
commitment to a new paradigm is best described as a 
"conversion experience" or a "gestalt switch." 
Many questions plague Kuhn's position here. If the 
dogmatism of normal science functions to reveal its own 
weaknesses, then the question is: to whom are such 
weaknesses revealed? Does an individual scientist escape 
dogmatism? If so, how? Does one ultimately escape 
dogmatism only by never having been dogmatic oneself? Kuhn 
comes off sounding this way when he speaks of paradigm 
change as taking place when one generation dies off and 
another takes its place. In this sense, then, scientists 
never do escape their dogmatism, though the next generation 
may (though they themselves would be fated for their own 
dogmas) . But then science would seem to change only 
because of dysfunctions in the educational patterns (or 
indoctrination methods) of its community. This is the 
danger Popper sees in the idea of normal science: the 
devaluation of criticism in favor of (dysfunctional) 
educational systems. 
Kuhn does provide more 'objective' reasons for taking 
anomaly seriously. 
In science .... novelty emerges only with difficulty, 
manifested by resistance, against a background 
provided by expectation. Initially, only the 
anticipated and the usual are experienced even under 
circumstances where anomaly is later to be observed. 
Further acquaintance, however, does result in 
awareness of something wrong or does relate the 
effect to something that has gone wrong before. 
That awareness of anomaly opens a period in which 
conceptual categories are adjusted until the 
initially anomalous has become the 
anticipated ..... Let me now point out that, 
recognizing the process, we can at last begin to see 
why normal science, a pursuit not directed to 
novelties and tending at first to suppress them, 
should nevertheless be so effective in causing them 
to arise. (Kuhn, 1970a:64) 
In other words, the dynamic of normal science itself, by 
which a paradigm is extended in its applications, leads to 
the emergence and recognition of novelty. Such novelty 
first "emerges" as anomaly, which gets transformed by the 
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process from the unexpected to the anticipated. Kuhn says 
that the scientific community struggles to make the anomaly 
"law-like" (Kuhn, 1977:174). He states 
Without the special apparatus that is constructed 
mainly for anticipated functions, the results that 
lead ultimately to novelty could not occur. And 
even when the apparatus exists, novelty ordinarily 
emerges only for the man who, knowing with precision 
what he should expect, is able to recognize that 
something has gone wrong. Anomaly appears only 
against the background provided by the paradigm. 
The more precise and far-reaching that paradigm is, 
the more sensitive an indicator it provides of 
anomaly and hence of an occasion for paradigm 
change. (Kuhn, 1970a:65) (my stress) 
It is one thing, of course, to identify an anomaly. 
It is another thing to determine its significance. The 
status of anomaly remains ambiguous: its existence alone 
does not necessarily warrant a crisis--there is no clear way 
of determining when an anomaly should be taken seriously, 
when it should be overlooked, when it may in fact eventually 
be solved within the framework of the existing paradigm, how 
much time should be permitted to allow for the emergence of 
such a solution, etc. Anomaly, then, does not always 
provide an occasion for paradigm change. The most one can 
say is that it ~ provide such an occasion. 
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Anomaly alone does not logically compel one to abandon 
a particular hypothesis, since there is no way of 
determining where exactly in the network of assumptions and 
hypotheses the problem exists which led one to make an 
incorrect prediction; additionally, there is no way of 
determining whether the problem rests with the hypothesis or 
with the assumptions underlying the hypothesis. Given an 
anomaly, therefore, one has no reason to abandon any 
particular hypothesis or, in Kuhn's case, paradigm. The 
upshot of the argument, then, is that neither anomaly alone 
can undermine commitment to a particular paradigm, nor 
should the solution to anomaly by another paradigm 
necessarily lead one to adopt it. Anomaly can, therefore, 
up to this point, serve as a point of connection between 
disparate paradigms, and may even provide the occasion for 
the emergence of a new paradigm, but it is not, either as 
solved or unsolved, sufficient to warrant a choice between 
paradigms. 
Kuhn's position here is actually no different from 
that of other philosophers of science. For example, 
Popper's view would be that commitment to an old theory 
('dogmatism') can be rationally motivated by the promise of 
potential epistemic gain. Rational motivation ends when one 
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def ends an old theory on the basis of increasingly ad hoc 
additions and conditions. Likewise, bold conjecture is 
rationally motivated by similar considerations of epistemic 
gain. 
For Popper, the requirements that must be satisfied by 
a scientist's expectations for epistemic gain are 
considerably less rigid than they are for Kuhn. Popper 
grants considerably more freedom to the scientist to make 
conjectures at any time. At least one reason for this is 
that any conjecture must be tested, and this testing is the 
final arbiter of a claim to any epistemic gain. For Kuhn, 
rational motivation is ultimately subject to a rigor of 
expectations issuing from the current practice of normal 
science. 18 It is not so much that the freedom Popper 
grants to the scientist is necessarily impermissible, but 
more that it is neither an efficient way for science to 
achieve its aims, nor the way that scientists typically do 
go about their activities. Once again, Kuhn differs on 
18 Later we will see Blumenberg make a similar point 
regarding historiography: 
That what is new in history cannot be arbitrary in 
each case, but rather is subject to a rigor of 
expectations and needs, is the condition of our 
being able to have such a thing as 'cognition' 
[Erkenntnis] of history at all. (Blumenberg 
1983:466) 
"strategic" grounds .19 
The differences between Kuhn and Popper on the 
function of conjecture are traceable, I suggest, to 
differences in their attitudes about underdetermination. 
The problem posed by underdetermination has two sides: a 
retrospective and a prospective side. The retrospective 
side of underdetermination raises the question concerning 
the justification of theories already available. The 
prospective side raises the question of what direction one 
can take in the future given retrospective underdeter-
mination. The retrospective side of underdetermination, 
taken alone, would seem to paralyze scientific activity. 
What sufficient reason could there be for a scientist to 
move forward with her work? 
Insofar as Popper is a firm believer in falsifi-
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ability, he believes that conjecture does not simply arise 
out of spontaneity, but is related to the falsification of a 
theory. Conjecture arises in response to where the shoe 
pinches, i.e., to specific problems in present theory 
l9 This is not to suggest that it is simply for 
strategic grounds, although Kuhn himself uses this language 
(1970b:243). Kuhn's Wittgensteinian-inspired approach to 
these issues differs in significant ways from Popper's more 
Kantian approach. Furthermore, Popper's imperative (which 
Kuhn calls both "ideological" [1970b:243] and "moral" 
[1970c:22]) to engage in revolutions in permanence (to 
ruthlessly conjecture) stands in remarkable contrast to, as 
we shall see, Kuhn's own more Aristotelian-inspired 
deference to the authority of the (scientific) community. 
This issue, particularly Popper's own understanding of the 
relationship of the autonomous conjecturer/critic to the 
community will be explored in the next chapter. 
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(Popper, 1989:129) Now, in the dispute with Kuhn, Popper 
seems to say something quite different. In challenging 
Kuhn's talk about crises, Popper holds up the example of 
Einstein as one who did not make his conjectures in the 
context of a crisis. In fact, Einstein's conjectures were 
responses to assynunetries that no one else saw either as 
endangering current theory or as needing extermination. The 
assynunetries were merely "ugly." Now as strong an objection 
as this may be to Kuhn, it is also at least moderately 
problematic for Popper as well. For Popper, there is no 
reason why one scientist engages in bold conjecture in a 
context where no one else sees a problem, and why another 
scientist is more clearly problem-driven. There is nothing 
"reasonable" about the activity of making bold conjectures--
it is simply a tradition of myth-making. One may question 
whether the motivation for epistemic gain might drive the 
conjectural act, but in this example the only motivation 
indicated is the aesthetic value of removing ugliness. I am 
not accusing Popper of blatant inconsistency or incoherence, 
but am simply trying to point out the level of 
sophistication at which the distinction between Kuhn and 
Popper becomes ascertainable. In the Einstein case, it 
appears that Popper grants considerable ground to the thesis 
that theory-change is primarily theory-driven. Of course 
Popper might respond that, not change, but only conjecture 
is theory driven. 
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Kuhn approaches the question of undetermination by 
asserting that puzzle-solving is the measure of scientific 
achievement. Specifically, Kuhn holds up the standard of 
exemplary problem solutions as the models by which future 
research can proceed. Undetermination means that a theory 
always says more than is warranted by nature. The theory is 
permitted this excess and will survive as long as it remains 
compatible with nature. In other words, a theory can always 
say "more" than nature warrants and still be considered a 
"fit" with nature as long as what is says is compatible with 
nature. 
The preceding recognizes that for Kuhn knowledge is 
not secured inductively, from the ground up, by piecemeal 
accumulation of observations. Instead, the search for 
knowledge begins with conjecture--"imaginative posits, 
invented in one piece for application to nature" (Kuhn 
1970c:10). The procedure of this search involves the 
"specification" or "articulation" of the theory by means of 
the application of exemplary problem solutions to gaps 
within the theory. These applications are what Kuhn calls 
puzzle-solving, and it is the dominant feature of normal 
science, by which scientists "explore nature to an esoteric 
depth and detail otherwise unimaginable." 
It is important to realize that for Kuhn this process of 
application incorporates testing at a 'latent' level. In 
other words, puzzle-solving does involve testing, but only--
as Popper might put it--as a second-order tradition. The 
primary impetus in puzzle-solving is to fill in the gaps. 
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This race to apply the exemplars to numerous puzzles may 
seem to be just another case of trying to be successful 
without being sure whether your success is due to knowledge 
or chance. In other words, it may seem to be a case of 
extension by means of the path of least resistance. In such 
a case, the excess claims our theory makes may be compatible 
with nature insofar as they are not expressly refuted. But 
such excesses could not claim to be knowledge, insofar as 
many constructions of the imagination could be posited that 
could not be falsified. 
Kuhn is not advocating this kind of path of least 
resistance. Instead, recognizing that the value of Popper's 
falsifiability principle (or, as Kuhn prefers to call it, 
the assymmetry principle) is its elevation of "resistance" 
into the surest marker of knowledge that we have, Kuhn is 
suggesting that the puzzle-solving path is the means to 
uncovering the most--and the most troublesome--resistance. 
Kuhn's point is simply that anomalies may occur at many 
points at many times, but no one believes that the mere 
existence of an anomaly refutes a theory. Furthermore, no 
one believes that the appearance of an anomaly even 
represents an immediate challenge to a theory. At best, one 
might say that it represents a potential challenge. But a 
scientist generally blames himself or other factors many 
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times over before he turns on the theory. Ultimately, 
though, the scientist may turn on the theory. 
However, even when the scientist turns on the theory, 
the rules, problems, and puzzle-solutions which have guided 
that theory continue to operate as standards of achievement, 
establishing burdens of proof against which competitor 
paradigms must measure up. In this way, the old paradigm 
functions in the process of discovering a likely successor. 
It does this by establishing the standards and problems to 
which the successor must be a response. Kuhn states it in 
the following way. 
Competing research progrannnes need not in principle 
display differences in fruitfulness. Whether or not 
they do, furthermore, at least one other criterion 
must be considered when choosing between them. A 
pref erred progrannne is expected not only to produce 
new achievements but also to conserve the 
achievements of the progranune it replaces. In that 
situation, the successes and failures of each 
progrannne provide the standards against which the 
other must be evaluated. Appraisal then becomes 
intrinsically relative, involving both progrannnes as 
well as nature from the start. (Kuhn, 1980:190) 
On the following page, Kuhn continues the same line of 
argument as follows: 
Whatever its difficulties, Sir Karl's [Popper] 
emphasis on falsification captured an aspect of 
scientific life that [Lakatos's] methodology of 
research progrannnes effectively ignores. A 
scientific theory embodies expectations about 
natural phenomena; those expectations can be 
disappointed; and, when they are, some scientists 
usually start to look for an alternate theory. In 
ignoring this function of severe anomaly, Lakatos's 
position has, I think, moved too far from Sir 
Karl's. But in a closely related respect it remains 
too close. Once a theory has been falsified (Sir 
Karl) or entered a degenerating phase (Lakatos), it 
may be displaced by another theory. According to 
both these viewpoints, however, the existence of a 
potential replacement theory appears pure 
coincidence. Neither falsificationism nor Lakatos's 
methodology suggests how closely successive theories 
or research programmes relate to each other: the 
successor is usually conceived in response to, and 
is often also shaped by, particular difficulties 
encountered in the development of its predecessor. 
(191) 
For Kuhn, science proceeds by means of a logic of 
provocation and response, such that paradigm choice takes 
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place within a context by which the adoption of one paradigm 
is simultaneously the displacement of another. 20 But this 
20 We can now see how Blumenberg' s criticism, to 
which I referred at the outset of this chapter, misses the 
mark. Blumenberg's comments can now be appreciated in full: 
The theory of 'scientific revoltions' describes, for 
the most part correctly, the breakdown of dominant 
systems as a result of their immanent rigorism, the 
'pedantic' disposition of every schoollike mode of 
thought, which leads with fateful inevitability to 
the self-uncovering of the marginal inconsistencies 
from which doubt and opposition break into the 
field. This conception of what historians have been 
pleased to call "downfalls" may be capable of 
generalization to a high level in relation to 
historical phenomena. But in relation to the new 
foundations called for afterward, to the preference 
given to the new "paradigm," this schema has no 
explanation whatever to offer. (Blumenberg 1983: 
465) 
Blumenberg goes on immediately to classify Kuhn's theory as 
fostering a "decisionist" approach to theory replacement. 
Whatever more serious oversights may have led to this 
particular interpretation, Paul Hoyningen-Huene has offered 
one possible source for the "decisionist" reproach: 
In the German-speaking world, the apparently quasi-
religious character of scientific revolutions became 
almost unavoidable with the translation of 
"conversion," or "to convert" by "Bekehrung" and 
"bekehren," respectively. (Hoyningen-Huene 
1993:258) 
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choice is not simply according to f alsif icationist 
standards, but also according to the concrete standards 
imposed by each paradigm. Other commentators (i.e., in 
addition to Blumenberg) have missed the functional role Kuhn 
assigns to the previous paradigm both in provoking the 
emergence of a new paradigm, and in setting specific 
standards for what can qualify as a new paradigm. We will 
see in chapter three that John Caputo misses, or perhaps 
disregards, the functional role played by a previous 
paradigm. 
The new paradigm, then, must satisfy the majority of 
the needs previously satisfied. The advantage to this 
procedure is that if a paradigm is simply abandoned at the 
first instance of anomaly, on the basis of a particular 
application of standards of testing, then, as Popper himself 
admits, the real power of the paradigm may never be 
discovered. The power of a paradigm is two-fold: its 
unfolding of the knowledge it may achieve, and its ability 
to eventually uncover those problems the solution to which 
will lead to significant advance. If a paradigm is 
abandoned before these problems are articulated, then 
science may proceed not only at a slower pace, but at a 
greater cost. 
Once this misunderstanding is cleared up, it becomes easier 
to see the parallels between Kuhn's claims and Blumenberg•s 
own provocation/response schema, which I will discuss in 
chapter four. 
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Summary 
The treatment of Kuhn's philosophy of science presented 
in this chapter corrects certain misconceptions of his 
position, and prepares the way for a clearer statement of 
the complementarity of dogmatism and revolution. 
Ultimately, for Kuhn--and as we shall see, ultimately, for 
Blumenberg--the affirmation of progress requires an 
affirmation of complementarity between revolutionary breaks 
and tradition continuity. 
Kuhn wants to affirm both dogmatic and revolutionary 
aspects of scientific inquiry. This is a difficult mix. 
How can dogmatism open itself to the kind of revolutionary 
critique which claims to comprise science's most dramatic 
advances? And yet, how can revolutionary critique measure 
the success it claims, if not against a frame of reference 
which can bridge the gap opened by the revolutionary break, 
and thereby of fer points of comparison? 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, the dogmatic 
side of science--normal science--is not inert. Its offer of 
stability incorporates its own distinctive dynamic. Normal 
science is not, therefore, the positing of a stable mass 
which then gets eroded by means of a constant barrage of 
criticism. It is not simply a target for criticism. Nor, 
finally, is it a passive system which avoids conflict. 
A central part of Kuhn's contribution is to highlight what 
is involved in the search for conflict. An important part 
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of that search is internal. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, conflict for Popper fosters the kind of competition 
within which the competencies and achievements of a theory 
(or lack thereof) can be revealed. Kuhn also appreciates 
the possibilities inherent in conflict, but is less sanguine 
than Popper about the prospects for a revolutionary conflict 
that is undertaken perpetually, or at any time. We will see 
in the next chapter that Popper himself, despite his loyalty 
to the credo "revolutions in permanence," does not dispense 
with a role for dogmatism. His own mix, however, may be no 
more satisfying than is Kuhn's. 
CHAPTER THREE 
POPPER: BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND ENTHUSIASM 
Insofar as Popper also recognizes the dogmatism that 
Kuhn has identified, he too must affirm some mix or 
complementarity between dogmatism and criticism in inquiry. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the kind of 
mix Popper offers. 
Popper interprets the role of dogmatism in inquiry as 
helping to establish "where the real power of our theories 
lies" (Popper 1970:55). Although it would be too simple to 
say (as a kind of summary of the first chapter) that for 
Kuhn such a determination is only made from within the 
paradigm itself, by means of a purely internal dynamic, 
still the determination of its power is not achieved only by 
an external critique either--as Popper seems to suggest with 
his idea of "revolutions in permanence." 
The importance of establishing the power of our 
theories, for Popper, lies in the contribution it makes to 
an assessment of the progress achieved through revolutionary 
theory change. Popper does not assess progress simply by 
measuring competing theories against nature; rather, an 
assessment of progress requires theory comparison. It is 
crucial, then, to be able to determine exactly what the 
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competing theories are. Popper states that a newly-accepted 
theory must always be able to explain fully the achievements 
of its predecessor (Popper 1994:12). It must be able to 
explain what the old theory had been. By the end of this 
chapter, we will be in a position to understand why Popper's 
thesis of permanent revolution--or perpetual framework 
breaking--risks failing to satisfy this very requirement: 
can revolutionary critique alone, as Popper understands it, 
make this determination? 
If we approach Popper's statements concerning dogmatism 
only from the perspective of a strong version of the 
doctrine of falsifiability, then we might feel, as Kuhn 
evidently does, that these statements are concessions that 
threaten the integrity of Popper's position. If, however, 
we approach Popper's overall position keeping these 
concessions in view from the start, then we see that 
Popper's position takes on a subtlety that perhaps Kuhn has 
not adequately considered. This subtlety reveals 
considerably more overlap between Kuhn's and Popper's 
position than is normally recognized, and so makes the 
resulting differences between them more significant. In 
this section I will explore Popper position on dogmatism. 
In the next section I will explore his position on the 
severity of criticism, and the corresponding boldness of 
conjectures. 
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The Legitimacy of Dogmatism in Inquiry 
Popper often gives the impression that he is an 
unequivocal opponent of dogmatism. He often lumps 
dogmatism, ideology, intolerance, and intellectual fashions 
together. In so describing these terms he opposes them to 
"criticism," which is at the heart of rationality and the 
growth of knowledge. He states, "I hold that orthodoxy is 
the death of knowledge, since the growth of knowledge 
depends entirely on the existence of disagreement" (Popper, 
1994:34). Most failures to advance knowledge are due to 
such orthodoxy. Popper therefore calls himself an "almost 
orthodox adherent of unorthodoxy" (34) . 
Throughout his discussions of such issues, however, he also 
makes careful distinctions which indicate both that his 
position is more subtle than a mere surface reading would 
capture, and that he senses a certain tension within the 
distinction between dogmatism and criticism. 
Popper's first 'concession' is an explicit one: " ... I 
am an admirer of tradition" (34). Popper, in fact, is a 
strong supporter of tradition. He mentions this as one of 
the points of overlap between Kuhn and himself that Kuhn 
seems to have missed (Schilpp, 1974:1195, n201). He not 
only wrote an article entitled, "Towards a Rational Theory 
of Tradition," but also refers to the "critical tradition" 
that the earliest Greek philosophers introduced (Popper, 
1989:126, 149; 1994:42). 
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But Popper not only acknowledges an appreciation for 
tradition, he correspondingly modifies his conception of 
dogmatism. He states that "there is even something like a 
methodological justification for individual scientists to be 
dogmatic and biased" (1994:94). He claims that "a limited 
amount of dogmatism is necessary for progress" (1994:16; 
1989:49). Thus, he begins to 'blame' not dogmatism as such, 
but "intolerant dogmatism" for being a main obstacle to 
science. The weight shifts from a distinction between 
dogmatism and criticism to a difference between tolerance 
and intolerance. Tenaciously defending a belief is an 
intellectual virtue, but such tenacity must always be 
coupled with tolerance (1994:45). Intolerant dogmatism 
presumably is defined as a disposition unwilling to modify, 
correct, or even give up one's theory. 
Popper provides yet another indication of the nuance 
involved when he states that the critical attitude itself 
"shares with the dogmatic attitude the quick adoption of a 
schema of expectations ... but .. is ready to modify it, to 
correct it, and even to give it up" (1989:49). The 
"adoption" of a schema by criticism cannot here be 
understood as being "addicted" (1994:53), which is 
characteristic of intolerant dogmatism. Instead, this kind 
of critical adoption does not wish to "be caught" in a 
mental prison. One only "accepts" or "commits" to a theory 
for the time being: that is, tentatively. Popper claims, in 
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fact, that the entire question of theory "acceptance" is 
over-rated (Popper 1994:102). Even after a period of 
sustained criticism one should not become too enamoured with 
a theory. He sees the idea of an accepted theory as a 
"residue of the dreams of authoritarian science prevailing 
in the days when people thought that we were just on the 
verge of completing the task of science" (103) . 1 
And yet, Popper also points out that one must be 
careful not to adopt a theory too lightly either, since it 
would seem to make little sense to speak of "adoption" at 
all without some sense of commitment. The positive sense of 
this warning was indicated above--namely, that theories do 
need to be tenaciously defended. Put negatively, Popper 
identifies a different extreme--at the opposite end of 
dogmatism, as it were--that he characterizes as "following 
intellectual fashion." The fashion-oriented are attentive 
to the "latest cry," and uncritically accept the currently-
ruling fad. They are "swayed by fashions," and "fear to be 
regarded as laggards" (57) . Here Popper touches upon what 
could be called the intellectual vice of "jumping ship," 
which indicates a lack of loyalty or an over-inflated fear 
of being 'caught' in error. Such people give up too 
1 Compare these comments with those of Imre Lakatos: 
Belief may be a regrettably unavoidable biological 
weakness to be kept under the control of 
criticism: but commitment for Popper is an 
outright crime. (Lakatos 1970: 92) 
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quickly, and do not try to salvage or defend a position to 
which they had committed themselves. At the first sight of 
a schema's failure to live up to one's expectations, it is 
abandoned. This is the vice of the intellectual avant-
garde. Rather than risk being behind the times, such people 
are "enthusiasts." 
I said that such fashion-conscious individuals are at 
the opposite extreme of intolerant dogmatists. If 
intolerant dogmatists refuse to give up their theory, then 
the enthusiasts are too quick to give up their theory. If 
the intolerant dogmatist is insulated from criticism, then 
the enthusiast is overly-sensitive to possible criticism. 
What makes them very similar is that neither group is 
willing to engage in the effort to modify and correct their 
theory. For Popper, this means that neither group is 
willing to engage in the activity of criticism. Dogmatism 
and enthusiasm are really two sides of the same coin. 
For Popper dogmatism and enthusiasm are species of 
relativism. The dogmatist retreats into a position that 
cannot (or at least will not) be falsified, and the 
enthusiast is driven to new positions constantly, without 
the benefit of knowing whether its new position is an 
advance upon the old one--that is, without the benefit of 
having learned from its mistakes. Between these two 
positions Popper inserts his understanding of the critical 
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tradition. 2 This tradition champions the belief that we 
can learn from our mistakes. Perhaps more importantly here, 
this tradition acknowledges the possibility of its own error 
(unlike intolerant dogmatism) and elevates the value of this 
possibility (unlike enthusiasm) . 
Popper himself is sometimes understood as being much 
closer on the spectrum to the enthusiast than to the 
dogmatist. For example, whereas the dogmatist is not open 
to criticism in any way, shape or form, the enthusiast at 
least acknowledges criticism. However, the form this 
acknowledgement takes form distinguishes Popper from it, 
insofar as it could be characterized vulgarly as positing 
that "the truth is merely the latest lie that hasn't yet 
been exposed." Such a "bad faith" disposition toward 
present conjectures motivates a desire to be agile enough 
never to get "caught" in the error. Error is inevitable and 
necessary on this understanding, but we nonetheless 
ceaselessly try to escape from this necessity. And of 
course the easiest way to effect such perpetual escapes is 
2 Insofar as Popper is a believer in progress, then, 
he does affirm (as we saw Kuhn and Blumenberg affirm in the 
last chapter) that there must be the background stability of 
a constant frame of reference for comparing progress. It is 
also important to note that, for Popper, theories are not 
simply compared or measured directly against reality--as 
Kuhn seems to interpret him. Finally, Popper's own emphasis 
on a critical tradition, and particularly on the difficulty 
of transplanting a tradition where one did not formerly 
exist, becomes extremely important for a fair understanding 
and appraisal of his position. See "Towards a Rational 
Theory of Tradition" (Popper 1989), p. 121. 
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to always remain uncommitted to any scheme of expectations. 
Some may hear a bit of Popper in these remarks: the 
difference may not be as sharp as Popper would like to think 
it is. However, what makes things interesting is that, as 
this section has attempted to show, the difference between 
Popper and the dogmatist is llQ ~ sharp. The way that 
Popper would like to draw the sharp distinction in both 
cases is through his emphasis on the "critical tradition," 
the tradition of trial and error. 3 We will see in the next 
section, however, that both the severity of criticism and 
the boldness of conjectures remain intimately related with 
both of these extremes. The importance of these 
relationships, I would suggest, is that they indicate that 
Popper's position does not rest exclusively on the prospects 
of a 'naive' falsificationist strategy--as Kuhn, for 
example, believes. 
Refutation as the Conjecture to Stop Defending a Theo:ry 
Two statements Popper makes in different contexts will 
eventually be important for discovering a link between his 
and Kuhn's work. The first statement, that a scientist 
should "leave it to others to fit his contribution into the 
3 An emphasis that Popper also shares with Gadamer, 
although, as we will see, there are considerable 
differences. Specifically, Gadamer identifies Popper's 
emphasis only with the "deliberate" side of human 
experience, and not enough from its "suffering" side (a side 
in which Kuhn might feel more at home) . See Truth and 
Method (Gadamer 1990), p. 353n.299. 
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framework of scientific knowledge" is the only one 
recognized by Kuhn (Popper, 1970:51). The spirit of this 
statement indicates that an individual scientist considering 
a conjecture should first test whether that conjecture can 
be falsified. That scientist should subject the conjecture 
to the most severe tests, and only if it passes these tests 
should it be opened to the criticism of others. It is then 
up to these others to criticize and test the conjecture, 
and, if they fail to falsify the conjecture through these 
exercises, they should then try to find a way to "tie it in" 
to other conjectures that have stood up to testing and 
criticism. 
It must be noted that Popper pref aces this description 
of scientific activity by stating that a conjecture is 
offered in response to a particular problem or problem-
situation. In another context, Popper advises a young, 
would-be scientist to go study the field, to find out what 
scientists are working on (1989:129). The young scientist 
learns the problem-situation through such study. The 
anticipated result is that this scientist will take on a 
problem that has arisen within the field and is relevant to 
the field. Any conjecture should then be in response to 
such a problem. 
Of course one of the problems this young scientist 
faces is getting others to take notice of the conjecture 
made. Even if the conjecture has passed the scrutiny of the 
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young scientist, will it be entertained as a possible 
solution to the problem by would-be critics? One must be 
careful here not distort what Popper is talking about. He 
does not take the route that is being heavily explored 
today--namely, to investigate the extent to which it is for 
sociological reasons that one gets heard. In other words, 
it is not because one has the right degree, or is a member 
in good standing in the right associations, etc., which 
provide the conduit for being heard. It is not the 
discipline to which one belongs that makes the difference, 
for problems cut right across disciplines (1989:67). As 
important as the other conditions are, for practical 
reasons, we must not fall into the trap of consigning the 
problems or the problem-situation to one discipline or 
another. There is no "natural" link between a discipline 
and its problems. 
For Popper, to suggest that it is ultimately for either 
sociological or disciplinary reasons that science proceeds 
as it does is to suggest that science has little choice but 
to be either dogmatic or enthusiastic in its approach. 
The individual scientist must not be primarily focused 
on the discipline, or on what, at one time, Kuhn called the 
disciplinary matrix. One's primary commitment must be to 
the problem--one needs to develop one's understanding of the 
problem, and show that one has been attentive to it. The 
essence of scientific activity, for Popper, is that 
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scientists, taken individually or as a group, must be 
directed to problem-situations, and organize themselves 
around such situations (rather than the reverse, which is 
what Popper considers the sociological position to be) . 
Scientists are not "guardians" of the problems (which is 
precisely what he understands Kuhn's scientists to be, 
insofar as Popper hears an echo of Plato's "closed society" 
in Kuhn's normal science) . 4 
Were we to grant Popper, for the time being, this 
description of the scientific attitude, we would still face 
at least two important questions: How bold can the 
individual scientist be in her conjectures concerning this 
problem? How aware must she be of the relationship of her 
conjecture to those conjectures that have already passed 
severe tests in the field? Both of these questions, I 
suggest, pertain to the meaning of the expression, "let 
others tie it in." 
There is no doubt that boldness is a primary virtue for 
Popper. He often advises the scientist to be bold in making 
conjectures, as well as to make bold conjectures. The first 
characteristic is one with which few would argue, although 
Popper's application of it is a bit vague, since boldness 
can be a characteristic of both the revolutionary-minded 
scientist hoping to make a significant contribution to the 
4 Again, note the differences between Popper's 
Kantian, and Kuhn's Aristotelian approaches to this issue. 
field, and the dogmatic-minded scientist insisting upon 
holding the ground against hostile criticism. Both 
scientists are putting themselves forward, as it were. 
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The second characteristic, however--making conjectures 
which are themselves bold--is the more controversial of the 
two, and is a focus of Kuhn's disagreement with Popper's 
position. Many of Popper's statements claim that the duty 
of the scientist is to make the boldest conjecture possible, 
so that at any time there should be a large number of bold 
conjectures available for testing and criticism. All of 
these conjectures would push the limits of what can be known 
to maximum strain. However, even here one always hooks up 
with a certain understanding of the problem-situation, and 
attempts to build upon gains previously made. A conjecture, 
in other words, always responds to both a problem-situation 
and to previous conjectures that have so far sustained 
severe testing. 
In order to see that the boldness of which Popper 
speaks is not quite so radical as he sometimes makes it 
appear to be, we can link the boldness of conjectures to the 
second of the two statements which link Popper to Kuhn. 
Popper suggests that an important threat to a 
scientist's continuing viability as a scientist is that a 
problem-situation might 'pass you by' (1974:23). Now on 
first glance this might seem to indicate that it is of 
primary importance for the individual scientist to "keep up" 
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with the latest trends or developments. However, Popper is 
wary of the virtue of "keeping up," since it seems to be a 
value most often esteemed by enthusiasts--i.e., those who 
favor intellectual fashions and fads. For people such as 
these, the vice corresponding to the virtue of keeping up is 
that of being a "laggard." The virtue of keeping up, taken 
in isolation, can lead to the mentality of the avant-garde. 
What, then, does Popper mean by warning that the 
scientist should not let the problem-situation pass her by? 
I would suggest that the warning provides room for that 
'legitimate' dogmatic impulse which Popper acknowledges, 
which includes not only the character of boldly and 
tenaciously defending a "pet theory," but now, here, also a 
certain inertia. It may seem strange to associate 
intellectual inertia with the name of Popper, but the 
context of the warning against letting the problem-situation 
pass one by suggests this very strategy. 
Popper suggests that one can become so overly-attentive 
to developing precision in one's position, that in the 
meantime the problem-situation may have developed in a 
different direction than has your own work. Popper is 
suggesting that you should not attempt to boldly develop 
your •resources' too early or too quickly--out of fear of 
being unprepared to cope with problems and objections. 5 
5 By using the word 'resource' here I am not 
suggesting that the scientist, in Popper's view, should be 
understood as 'withholding' or 'deferring' an account (as a 
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Instead, by being a bit inert you may develop your position 
and have a contribution to make only when you are called 
upon to do so--that is, you may develop precision at the 
right time precision is called for. In the meantime, you 
should tarry for a response to what you have offered, and/or 
remain open to the developments in the problem-situation 
which actually take place (and not simply to those which 
have been anticipated by you) . You must allow yourself the 
chance to be given a "reception." 6 
If this is in fact an accurate interpretation of 
Popper's position, then Popper should be located differently 
than in the place standing at the opposite extreme of 
dogmatism. Popper would stand between what he calls an 
"intolerant dogmatism" and an enthusiastic avant-gardism. 
deconstructist might argue)--but simply as giving himself 
over {gQ_ a resourceful conversation partner) to the reaction 
of the community--i.e., as opening himself to an exchange. 
This certainly foreshadows Gadamer's work, but for another 
interesting discussion of this, see Stanley Cavell, This New 
Yet Unapproachable America (Albuquerque: Living Batch, 
1989), p. 23ff. 
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"Reception," we will see, is a technical term in 
Blumenberg's vocabulary. I will discuss it in Chapter Four 
within the context of the "reception" of Copernicus's 
theory. In brief, the issue hinges on what leads a 
scientist to expect that she will be "given" a "reception?" 
For Kuhn, normal science routinely provides this framework. 
For Gadamer, it is tradition. But what about in 
revolutionary periods? What is it that would lead 
Copernicus to expect that his proposal might not just be 
heard, but received--and hence, in Kuhn's terms, "normalize" 
relations? Popper, of course, would not like the term 
"normalized relations," nor the "routine" provision of a 
framework, though his position here seems to call for some 
such thing (Popper 1974:1152). 
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One could interpret both of Popper's statements--"let others 
fit it in," and "don't let the problem situation pass you 
by 11 --as advice to always be on the cutting edge of things, 
part of the vanguard. And yet, being part of the cutting 
edge might actually have to be understood a bit more 
modestly, as incorporating a dogmatic element: an element 
which values tarrying at the spot where one is; an element 
that balances the tendency that reflects an oversensitivity 
to refutation; an element that--as Kuhn might put it--
ultimately sees anomalies only where there are anomalies to 
be found. 
Another way to approach this aspect of Popper's 
position is by way of the unfortunate duality that Kuhn 
imposes on himself and Popper as a means to set himself off 
from the latter. Kuhn uses the language of challenger and 
challenged, where presumably in the situations most 
characteristic of scientific activity Kuhn believes the 
scientist sees himself as challenged (by some puzzle, 
through his understanding of the theory--or lack thereof), 
whereas Popper believes the scientist sees himself as the 
challenger (of the theory, in the name of the problem) (Kuhn 
1970c:Sn.1). In other words, says Kuhn, when a difficulty 
is encountered the scientist normally accuses himself, not 
the theory. Popper, on the other hand, is all too willing 
to abandon the theory. This is why Kuhn sees it as such a 
mark against Popper's position to concede that falsification 
cannot be conclusive: it undercuts the legitimacy of 
Popper's advice to scientists to abandon a theory in 
difficulty. It is clear from this that Kuhn sees Popper 
primarily as an enthusiast. 
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Were this to be his position, then Popper would face 
some difficult questions. For one, how is it that the 
scientist achieves this status as challenger, particularly 
since Popper himself suggests that the normal course of 
study for the scientist is to begin by looking for 
challenges, by looking for problems in the field. The first 
challenge for the young, would-be scientist is to find the 
challenges the field finds relevant, and to come to 
understand these challenges. But how is it that such a 
challenged young person soon finds herself to be the 
challenger--how has a problem become so clear to her that 
she can henceforth speak so boldly concerning it? 
The duality between challenger and challenged, however, 
cannot be successfully applied to Popper's position--
particularly for the ends to which Kuhn dedicates it. But 
the failure of this application is quite instructive, for it 
helps to uncover how the scientist operates no less as, 
alternately, challenger and challenged in Popper's scheme 
than in Kuhn's. Specifically, for Popper the scientist 
(whether young or established) does not have direct access 
to a problem--at least not the kind of access through which 
that scientist could take it upon herself to "speak in its 
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name." For this reason, it is not the disposition to 
conjecture (boldly or otherwise) that is important for 
Popper, so much as the disposition to remain focussed on a 
problem. But, according to Popper, that disposition is 
precisely the problem! How does one address a problem? How 
does one identify it, get clear about it? 
According to Popper, one certainly must make a 
conjecture which purports to solve the problem--a conjecture 
which, he says, will probably fail. But between the 
conjecture and the judgment of failure Popper does insert--
contrary to Kuhn's reading of him--a significant amount of 
scientific activity, activity which cannot simply be 
described under the category of "testing"--as Kuhn 
understands Popper to mean it: subjecting the theory to 
maximum strain. To say that the theory is constantly being 
maximally strained is a kind of hyperbole which conceals the 
fact that the theory has not been "given over" to testing 
because it has not yet (if the conjecturing scientist has 
followed Popper's advice) been completely worked out in all 
its possibilities. 
For Popper, then, the idea of criticism is much more 
complex than some parts of his writings seem to suggest, and 
certainly more complex than Kuhn would seem to indicate. 
Specifically, criticism plays upon what Kuhn might call a 
"strategy": the scientist who makes a conjecture must be 
open to criticism in the sense that she must leave herself 
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open to the response of other scientists--must put herself 
in a position against which criticism might be offered. But 
being open to criticism includes not having already 'over-
developed' or exhausted your resources on your own 
anticipations of the direction the problem will take, but 
rather expending those resources in an exchange opened at 
the proper time. In this sense, criticism doesn't open a 
space for itself, but is also dependent upon the opening 
provided by the scientist making the conjecture. Both 
conjecture and criticism are led by the developing problem-
situation. The success of criticism relies upon the 
reciprocity of quid pro quo. In this scenario, 
falsification would still remain "knowing what it would take 
for you to give up your theory ... ," but this "knowing in 
advance .... " is tempered by the fact that the conjecture is 
only developed to a certain point before it is opened to 
criticism by adherents of the established scientific 
conununity/tradition. 
I would suggest that Popper recognizes that the virtue 
of "opening yourself to criticism" incorporates a constraint 
on the boldness of our conjectures. If Popper seems to 
favor severe criticism of conjectures, this is less because 
he feels that we are in the position to act at any time as 
challengers to our theories in the name of the problems, 
than because he recognizes that our conjectures are always 
constrained significantly by a strategy which necessarily 
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"holds back" in order to open itself to criticism, and to 
the demands of the developing problem situation. We can 
"afford" criticism of the conjectures we favor. But we also 
ne..e.Q to open ourselves to criticism, since our conjectures 
are made in response to an understanding of the problem-
si tuation that is always inadequate. 
To understand Popper's position, it is again important 
to see it suspended between two opposites. On one hand, 
Popper is an enemy of any description of scientific activity 
which would reduce that activity to some "routine" or 
another. This is the threat he identifies with Kuhn's 
position. At best, such a routine is only effective as 
"applied science." As such, it falls short of the criticism 
and novelty requisite for scientific advance. But on the 
other hand, Popper also recognizes that conjecture can also 
be "too bold" or even a bit "wild." When Popper speaks in 
these terms, he indicates that advance in science is not 
constrained ~by ideology or human failing. That is, 
although Popper focuses most on the obstacles to advance 
presented by ideology and human failing, there are other, 
positive constraints operative within conjecture and 
refutation that must be recognized, not just these negative 
ones: specifically, the question/answer framework as 
currently established by the scientific community {the 
"field"). 
If the foregoing presents a fair and more nuanced 
63 
reading of Popper than is sometimes offered, then the 
question which can be addressed to Popper is the following: 
Having affirmed the necessary function of the "field," how 
much or how little can one disregard it as a constraint on 
the conjectures that could plausibly be entertained, 
criticized, and tested at any time? Of course one may grant 
to Popper that the "field" is not reducible to any 
particular discipline, since problems may cut across many 
disciplines at any one time. And yet, the field does not 
seem to be reducible to just the problems either. We have 
no independent access to the problems as individuals, but 
recognize that the problem might always move in an 
unanticipated direction through the efforts of others. 
Popper does affirm the role of a discipline in introducing a 
scientist to the field, and it does not seem that "a" 
discipline ever becomes dispensible. At the very least, the 
discipline seems instrumental to criticism. 
At one point he calls his view a romantic ideal or a 
heroic ideal of science (1974:977). Scientific activity is 
represented best through the bold activity of its heroes. 
When Popper speaks this way, the role of the field or 
discipline--the scientific "community" itself--seems to be 
seriously subordinated. On the other hand, this rhetoric 
about boldness should not disguise the fact that Popper 
admits that naive falsification cannot underwrite the 
activities such heroic boldness requires. But the important 
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question here is: why would such heroic boldness not become 
linked to a supersensitivity to refutation? For Popper it 
must not be so linked--but in order to avoid this link 
boldness must, rather paradoxically, open itself toward 
dogmatism. Popper even associates this kind of dogmatism 
with debate (1974:). Dogmatism. it would seem. is at the 
very core of criticism. It is not an external extra added 
to it--a supplement; so much so, in fact, is dogmatism 
necessary to criticism, that the results of debate are never 
quite decisive: "As always, science is conjecture. You 
have to conjecture when to stop defending a favourite 
theory, and when to try a new one" (1974:984). 
Now, if conjecture should be bold,then it seems that 
not only should one's conjectures themselves be bold, but 
the act of conjecturing should be bold; in other words, one 
should boldly conjecture that one is in need of a new bold 
conjecture. But even here, one would not do this at the 
price of debate--if one were to ALWAYS determine that 
boldness is in order, then there would be no way of 
separating this from supersensitivity to refutation. There 
seems to be needed a kind of courage to suffer through a 
debate with the tradition, 1 to toughen one's sensitivity, 
filld to discover the possibilities inherent in the theory you 
(force yourself to) defend and/or attack. Boldness, then, 
1 Perhaps this is, after all, the suffering side of 
experience to which Gadamer seeks to draw our attention. 
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is not always simply a framework breaker. It is possible 
that boldness is a virtue that knows when to defend and when 
to attack. 
Aristarchus: A Case Study 
Popper does not seem to have settled in his own mind 
exactly what constitutes boldness and when boldness has 
become overextended--what he calls a bit wild. For example, 
he says at one point that the hypotheses of Aristarchus 
"seem to have been too bold, and they were soon forgotten" 
(1994:43). On this reading, it is possible to conjecture 
too boldly, so much so that the hypothesis is not seriously 
entertained, has no effect, and is soon forgotten. Yet at 
another point, Popper says that the theory could not be 
accused of being too bold--at least not for everyone--and 
Popper cites Seleucus' support for the hypothesis as 
support. He goes on to say, 
And yet, for some obscure reason, only a few brief 
reports of the theory have survived. Here is a 
glaring case of the only too frequent failure to 
keep alternative ideas alive. 
Whatever the details of the explanation, the 
failure was probably due to dogmatism and 
intolerance. But new ideas should be regarded as 
precious, and should be carefully nursed--
especially if they seem to be a bit wild. I do 
not suggest that we should be eager to accept new 
ideas jJ.w_t. for the sake of their newness. But we 
should be anxious not to suppress a new idea even 
if it does not appear to us to be very good. 
(1994; 14) . 
Two comments are in order here. First, it is clear 
that Popper's main concern is that alternatives ideas must 
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be kept alive. According to Popper, ideas are "only too 
rare," and may easily, though not justifiably, be neglected. 
One of Popper's biggest worries is that specialization and 
"the publication explosion may kill ideas" {14) . Ideas may 
easily get submerged in the flood of publication. Neither 
the scientific spirit nor the critical tradition are 
guaranteed. They can be lost. In fact, Popper seems to be 
quite worried that they are presently being sacrificed 
{1994:51). I think that one must link Popper's concern for 
the availability of alternatives with his "heroic" view of 
science: because ideas can easily be submerged, we need 
heroes and heroic efforts to continually bring forth new 
ideas. We need bold conjectures proposed by bold 
conjecturers. 
The second conunent pertains to Popper's claim that 
failur~ to keep alternatives alive is "probably due" to 
dogmatism and intolerance. One can credit Popper for not 
making the claim too strong, but at the same time may 
question whether the gap opened up between the arena where 
conjectures are made and that where intolerant dogmatism 
reigns is not too wide. Might there not be other reasons, 
factors, or influences involved that could assist in the 
effort to account for the neglect of alternative ideas? 
In other words, one might ask why this failure is 
necessarily or always illegitimate--the mark of bad science. 
We might even ask, in light of the above statement that one 
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must conjecture when to stop defending a theory, a Popperian 
question: why couldn't it be that the failure to keep 
alternative ideas alive is due to making the conjecture that 
one can make do without these ideas? Why should this 
conjecture be ruled out. or be considered a bad conjecture? 
How is it that this conjecture is one that should not have 
been made? Is some mistake made in conjecturing that one 
can do without these conjectures {ideas)? Was, for example, 
some mistake made in not following Aristarchus' conjecture? 
Doesn't the very process of science involve the conjecture, 
the risk, that one can make do without a particular 
conjecture? 
To repeat, this is not to say that intolerance plays no 
part, but it also need not account for the entire failure. 
In short, the failure to keep alternative ideas alive can 
sometimes be traced to the process of scientific activity 
itself, just as it can sometimes be traced to intolerant 
dogmatism. 
Of course, to say that one rejects a conjecture because 
one has made the conjecture that one can do without it, must 
include the proviso that one has reasons for doing so. The 
presence of such reasons would separate this rejection from 
a rejection due solely to intolerant dogmatism. Here we 
seem to reach one of those points where Popper wants to 
distance himself from Kuhn, for Popper seems to believe that 
Kuhn's vision of scientific activity permits {and even 
praises) intolerant dogmatism--i.e., dogmatism without 
reasons. In other words, on Popper's reading of Kuhn, the 
failure to keep alternatives alive is not because of the 
presence of good reasons, but only because of a dogmatic 
spirit. 
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But, from Kuhn's perspective, if Popper .d.Qe.s. recognize 
that there can be legitimate reasons for failing to keep 
alternative alive, then he owes us a more detailed account 
of how this is not only an important characteristic of 
scientific activity, but actually serves that activity. 
Kuhn's description of normal science, I will argue, attempts 
to provide just such an account. I will return to this 
issue in the last chapter, after the contributions made by 
Gadamer and Blumenberg have been incorporated into the 
discussion. 
Summary 
As we have seen, Popper grants a central place to 
dogmatism. In fact, we found dogmatism to be at the very 
heart of revolutionary criticism. For neither Popper nor 
for Kuhn is dogmatism a passive target for criticism (an 
acquiescence or complacency in a present, satisfying, and 
determinable achievement), nor is it a failure to engage in 
criticism. Criticism remains accountable to the framework 
it would reject, insofar as it must offer an account of that 
framework-- what it has been, what it has achieved--and to 
preserve within itself the competencies to match or surpass 
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those achievements. 
We saw that for Popper one has to conjecture when to 
stop defending a pet theory. Refutation of a theory always 
includes an element of conjecture. One conjectures that 
one's determination of what the theory is legitimates trying 
a new conjecture. But unless the conjecture to reject is 
irreversible (and Popper says nothing to indicate he 
believes it is necessarily irreversible), it must remain 
open to the criticism of the community of defenders. It 
cannot simply accuse these def enders of an intolerant 
dogmatism. 
What is important about this is that it raises a 
question about the steady availability of framework-
breaking. Popper acknowledges that we are "prisoners caught 
in the framework of our theories" (Popper 1970:56), though 
he believes we can break free of any framework at any time. 
Is it only an "attitude" toward our present condition which 
decides whether we will passively remain within a framework 
or break free from it? 
It would seem that for Popper more is involved than 
simply an attitude. Popper would probably say that to be 
open to criticism is already to be disposed toward breaking 
free of a framework. But being open to criticism does not 
mean that one cannot legitimately be a defender of a 
framework, as Popper admits. Furthermore, being disposed 
toward breaking free of a framework is not something which 
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Kuhn rejects (Kuhn 1970b:242). Far less does he believe 
that normal science immunizes itself against criticism--for 
Kuhn does leave the door open for the revolutionary impulse 
at any and all times (248) . 
If we understand Popper's point about the value of the 
revolutionary disposition as intending the generation of 
criticism from outside the framework, then we might 
understand Kuhn's point as intending the generation of 
criticism from within the framework. This means not seeing 
a framework only as an obstacle to progress--as a dogmatic 
shackle weighing down the critical spirit--but as an 
enabling condition that makes criticism possible. Failure 
to recognize the enabling function of a framework, we saw, 
is the characteristic failure of "enthusiasm." No less than 
the intolerant dogmatist, the enthusiast immunizes itself 
from the criticism of that from which it broke. 
As we will see in the next chapter, an appreciation for 
the enabling function of a framework--an appreciation for 
tradition--is what Gadamer contributes to this issue. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GADAMER'S REHABILITATION OF TRADITION 
Were we to begin to define Gadamer's notion of tradition 
in the terms used at the end of the last chapter--terms 
familiar to Popper and Kuhn--we might identify it initially 
as a framework which is not just an obstacle to progress, 
but a positive enabling condition for it. In Kuhn's terms, 
it is a framework which "must be lived with and explored" 
(1970b:242). The rehabilitation of our understanding of 
tradition has been a central feature of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. 
In this chapter we will begin to see how Gadamer's 
hermeneutics clarifies the necessary and positive role 
dogmatism and tradition play in the activity of criticism. 
First, I will confirm Richard J. Bernstein's interpretation 
of the parallel between Kuhn's and Gadamer's views on 
judgment (phronesis), over against John Caputo's conjunction 
of Kuhn with Jacques Derrida. On Caputo's reading, normal 
science fully dissolves into a state of revolution, within 
which state the values once shared by scientists become 
"utterly ineffective." Kuhn's position, I will argue, 
suggests no such meltdown of judgment, nor of the conditions 
supporting it. 
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Second, I will argue that Gadamer's analysis of the 
structure of experience is important for showing how both 
normal and revolutionary science involve experiences that 
are both falsifying and confirming. For Gadamer, the 
process of experience is essentially negative, though 
falsification can also confirm aspects of tradition. 
Tradition passes on that which has not been falsified. In 
Popper's terms, the expectations by which we are guided have 
withstood every test to which we have subjected them. 
Third, the essentially negative structure of experience 
is articulated through the model of dialogue--through a 
process of question and answer. "We cannot have experiences 
without asking questions" (Gadamer 1990:362). We experience 
through the openness breached by asking a question--an 
openness which is not unlimited, however: that is, not 
without horizon or framework (362) . 
In these three ways Gadamer's hermeneutics develops 
Kuhn's position on the dogmatism implicit in normal science. 
The problem which will arise, however, is that Gadamer's 
hermeneutics leaves little room for the deployment of the 
concept of revolution--which is a central affirmation of 
Kuhn's philosophy of science. By way of anticipation of the 
points to be made in the final chapter, I offer the 
following assessment of some of the differences between 
these two. 
Although Kuhn's claims concerning the dynamic of normal 
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science share with Gadamer the belief that criticism can be 
generated from within a framework, Kuhn departs from Gadamer 
in insisting that criticism does not simply reform that 
framework. For Gadamer, the framework of tradition is 
renewed by means of a fusion of horizons that rises "to a 
higher universality that overcomes not only our own 
particularity but also that of the other" (1990:305). For 
Kuhn, on the other hand, the framework finally becomes 
incapable of sustaining the very questions and answers it 
originally asserted to be within its competence, and thereby 
undergoes a crisis in identity--so much so, in fact, that 
scientists find it difficult to understand what the 
framework is: in what its achievements consist, and where 
its competencies lie (Kuhn 1980:190-1). The dogmatic 
impulse aims at the restoration of this identity. The 
revolutionary impulse also serves to identify what the old 
framework was--and insofar as this is the case, there is 
considerable overlap in motivation and activity. However, 
the revolutionary impulse ultimately manifests itself not in 
the service of reform, but rather in order to identify that 
over against which it may identify itself. For a 
hermeneutic development and clarification of these very same 
points, we will need to turn, in the last chapter, to the 
work of Hans Blumenberg. 
The Dispute over Values 
The similarity of Kuhn's position on values and 
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Gadamer's appropriation of the Aristotelian idea of 
phronesis has been noted by many commentators, most notably 
Bernstein (1983) and Rorty (1979) . As Bernstein points out, 
phronesis is a kind of practical rationality that involves 
deliberation and choice (1983:54). Moreover, the judgments 
characteristic of phronesis do not so much reflect the 
application of rules, but rather the application of values. 
Whereas judgment according to rules involves the subsumption 
of the particular under the universal, judgment according to 
values involves the identification and interpretation of .the 
universal appropriate to the particular. Furthermore, just 
as phronesis is developed within a community or polis, so 
for Kuhn the deliberations guided by values are most 
effective within the practice of normal science. 
In what follows I will not challenge these particular 
similarities, but rather test their limits. Before doing 
so, however, it may be helpful at this point to briefly 
introduce the orientation of Gadamer's work and its 
relevance to the issues developed in the previous two 
chapters. 
The title of Gadamer's main work, Truth and Method, is a 
bit deceiving, insofar as Gadamer does not attempt within 
its pages to find a method proper to the human sciences--far 
less to claim to have discovered such a method; rather, 
Gadamer attempts to show that the concern with a need for 
"method" provoked an attempt by the human sciences to model 
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themselves after the pattern of the natural sciences--the 
"method" of which was seen as one of its most significant 
accomplishments. The modelling of the human sciences after 
the fashion of the natural sciences thus arose from a common 
concern--the foreignness [Fremdheit] we feel in relationship 
to the world (Gadamer 1990:65) . 1 It is important to see 
that Gadamer is not simply claiming that the methodological 
aspirations of the natural sciences were transferred to the 
human sciences, as a model of success. Instead, he is 
arguing that if such a transference did take place, it is 
somewhat understandable as a response due to the similarity 
between their concern with foreignness. 
Gadamer's claim is that, particularly in the human 
sciences, method does not overcome our foreignness, but 
actually exacerbates it. 2 Particularly in the human 
sciences, method alienates the knower from her own 
"historicity," and from her own standpoint within tradition 
(a point particularly important for the issue of this 
paper). The primary focus of Gadamer's criticism is this 
1 Bernstein calls 
(1983:16ff.) 
this the Cartesian anxiety 
2 The very deployment of method both contributes to 
and reveals the contours of our foreignness. Rather than it 
being the case, then, that we should never have gone down 
the path of "method," Gadamer seems to be suggesting that 
following this path has served an important hermeneutical 
function--has served to reveal hidden dimensions of meaning, 
or hidden dimensions of our foreignness. 
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alienation. 3 The upshot of Gadamer's criticism is that the 
self-alienating concern for method that has characterized 
both the natural and human sciences has resulted in the 
relativism of historicism, and the objectivization of 
tradition into a dead, non-authoritative, museum-piece 
curiosity. As Richard J. Bernstein characterizes it: we 
find ourselves in an unenviable predicament between 
objectivism and relativism. 4 
With this as a background, we can now turn the issue of 
values and their role in scientific activity. 
As I have already pointed out, for Kuhn the concept of 
crisis plays a central role in his account of the dynamic of 
scientific activity, a role which is set-off against the 
stability characteristic of normal science. For Gadamer, 
there is no such balance. Nor, for that matter, is there 
for Derrida. To put the issue somewhat formulaically: if 
for Gadamer phronesis is always operative and always 
effective, such that one may question if there ever are 
crises, and if for Derrida phronesis is neither always 
operative nor always effective, such that crises are 
prevalent and persistent, then for Kuhn phronesis is always 
3 Note, then, that the standpoint for Gadamer's own 
criticism is a position within tradition, at which point our 
alienation has been revealed through our own contributions 
to, and participation in, its intensification. 
4 The point which is reflected in the title of 
Bernstein's book: Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983); 
see also: Blumenberg (1987:123ff.), and Nietzsche (1995). 
77 
operative and effective, but not in the same way during 
crisis as it is during periods of relative stability (normal 
science) . 
For Gadamer, the relevance to hermeneutics of 
Aristotle's analysis of phronesis lies the task of 
"application" which both share (1990:315). Specifically, 
both are concerned with the task of "applying something 
universal to a particular situation" (312) . For Aristotle, 
according to Gadamer, "the task of making a moral decision 
is that of doing the right thing in a particular situation--
i .e., seeing what is right within the situation and grasping 
it" (317). But the task of application is more problematic 
than this (since this description of phronesis does not 
adequately distinguish it from techne) : "For we can only 
apply something that we already have; but we do not possess 
moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and 
then apply it to specific situations" (317). Instead, our 
knowledge of a law is "productively determined by" its 
application to a particular case (38) . The task of 
application in hermeneutics is remarkably the same, in that 
the appropriation of tradition by understanding is a 
productive determination of its possibilities, by means of 
its application to our situation. 5 
Although Bernstein's analysis links Gadamer's and 
s This is why Gadamer calls understanding 
"participating in an event of tradition" (290) . 
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Kuhn's positions, he does direct the question to Gadamer 
whether, in fact, phronesis can be sufficient and effective 
in times of crisis. Bernstein points out that phronesis 
presupposes not only the existence of a community, but also 
the existence of nomoi within the community (1983:157). 
Might we not experience a crisis concerning what norms 
phronesis should draw upon? Might not the problem of the 
interpretation (or application) of norms be extended in some 
cases to the problems of the shared acceptance and stability 
of the norms themselves (157)? Specification of norms 
through application is one thing, but might not confusion 
run so deep as to press the question which norms are the 
appropriate ones to specify (158)? Such problems, says 
Bernstein, raise the question concerning the conditions for 
the operation of phronesis. 
John Caputo focuses his attack at precisely this 
point. According to Caputo, there are points in the history 
of science when the phronesis of the scientist will not do, 
because what that phronesis presupposes is no longer 
effective (Caputo 216) . He states, 
Phronesis functions only within an existing 
framework, an established paradigm. It is a 
fundamentally conservative notion in the best sense 
of that word, that is, it knows how to keep 
something alive, to renew it in changing 
circumstances but always within the compass of an 
established order. It requires a stable paradigm, a 
more or less fixed order. Aristotle conceived of 
the functioning of phronesis within a fundamentally 
stable polis, not within a period of revolutionary 
conflict. (Caputo 217) 
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In a letter to Bernstein which the latter appended to 
his Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, Gadamer for his part 
questions whether we are ever in a state characterizable as 
collapse. He says, "The conflict of traditions we have 
today does not seem to me to be anything exceptional" 
{Bernstein 1983:264). He also claims that "the displacement 
of human reality never goes so far that no forms of 
solidarity exist any longer." As my presentation of 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics proceeds in more 
detail, it will become clear why Gadamer cannot permit, much 
less imagine, a situation in which the breakdown of 
community, or the paradigmatic, normative framework, could 
be complete. The solidarity and consensus of "community" is 
never simply the accomplishment of the members of the 
community. The community always points beyond itself and 
draws upon resources that surpass what the community 
realizes at any time. The corrnnunity always stands within a 
relationship to what Gadamer calls die Wirkungsgeschichte, a 
relationship which above all else must remain "open," and of 
which we must become "conscious." 
According to Caputo, however, Kuhn departs 
dramatically from Gadamer when he argues that the criteria 
upon which phronesis draws--the criteria characterizing a 
good theory: accuracy, scope, consistency, etc.--are in 
times of crisis "utterly ineffective" in resolving such 
conflict {Caputo 218). In fact, these criteria "are of no 
80 
practical use," presumably because they are indeterminate--
quite unlike "the determinacy of an Aristotelian virtue" 
(218) . 6 Caputo draws three conclusions from this: 
First, rather than search for more determinate 
criteria with the aid of which phronesis could carry out it 
function, 
... we must confess the play, for what causes 
phronesis to founder is just the unavailability of 
criteria. It is only after a free argument has 
played itself out that we can afterward, with a 
logic that limps along lamely after the fact, 
reconstruct what sort of moves reason made which won 
the day. And it is only afterward, after the 
conditions for a new wave of normal science have 
been forged, that phronesis can again have a 
place ... (Caputo 310, nlO). 
Phronesis is ineffective for deliberation and cannot provide 
reasons for the choices made. Whatever the nature of the 
"free argument," it is not phronetic. We can only 
reconstruct reasons after the fact--presumably from the 
perspective of the winner. 
Second, what is at stake in such times of conflict "is 
not only a particular paradigm but science itself (219) ." 
And with this, Kuhn's position becomes very close to that of 
Derrida. It is what Caputo calls "Kuhn's most Parisian 
moment (220) ." 
Normal science flourishes because of its 
authoritarian practices. But that is not an 
objection to normal science for Kuhn or Derrida. Il 
.f.aJJ.t. lg verite. Science flourishes because of the 
6 Here I refer the reader back to the debate with 
Laudan. For a more nuanced reading of the "determinacy" 
implied by Aristotelian virtue, see Gadamer 1990:312-324. 
violence with which it enforces its paradigm (which 
is a Parisian way of saying that the scientific 
community is organized around a paradigm which it 
believes in) and because of the violence that the 
paradigm inflicts on the world (a Parisian way of 
saying a conceptual framework, a way of seeing 
things) . (220) 
Science, then, is characterizable as a 11 violence 11 --against 
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both itself, in its communal aspect, and the world. Caputo 
hesitates here, however, recognizing that this 
characterization seems closer to Feyerabend than to Kuhn. 
He therefore puts conditions on the convergence. 
If Kuhn thinks that there actually is a time when 
"normal science" is peacefully settled into place 
and has the faith of everyone, then a Derridean 
would suspect that that is a sirnplif ication (just as 
he would suspect Heidegger's epochal units). If, on 
the other hand, Kuhn thinks that normal science is 
honored more in the breach than in the observance, 
then Derrida would not object to this idea. (221) 
Caputo recognizes and challenges the position Kuhn might 
like to adopt here--a position less radical than that of 
Derrida and considerably more Gadarnerian. The challenge is 
whether there ever is, in fact, a time when normal science 
actually exists, and, if so, whether such an existence can 
claim anything more for itself than the violence by which it 
imposes itself. 
Third, for Kuhn the dynamic of science does not lead 
to a tighter convergence or match between paradigm and 
reality. What this means, for Caputo, is that "the shift 
f rorn one paradigm to another does not stern f rorn a deeper 
insight into nature but from a shift of strategy in coping 
with the puzzles faced by the scientist, in coping with the 
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flux (221} ." Kuhn "intimates," therefore, that the 
projections of science are "fictions," which do not disclose 
the things themselves, but rather issue in "social 
consensus" and "pragmatic will-to-power" (221-2} . In short, 
Kuhn's position, on Caputo's reading, represents a serious 
departure from that of Gadamer. If Kuhn wishes to retain 
proximity to Gadamer's end of the spectrum, then the general 
challenge to him--as the summation and thrust of the three 
conclusions given above--is how to account for the dynamic 
of science, and especially of normal science, as being 
something other or more than imposed violence. 
Kuhn's position, in fact, does retain some proximity 
to Gadamer's. His claims, to that effect, are two-fold. 
First, the criteria characterizing a good paradigm are not 
indeterminate such that they are "utterly ineffective" or 
"of no practical use" apart from that paradigm. Second, 
science does not simply impose paradigms on nature by an act 
of violence only euphemistically called agreement. Nature 
cannot simply be forced into conceptual boxes, and certainly 
not arbitrarily so. 
Concerning the first point, Kuhn argues that if the 
criteria were as indeterminate, ineffective, and useless as 
Caputo suggests, then the objections levelled at Kuhn of 
"mob psychology" would be warranted. But for Kuhn, "one 
characteristic of a mob is its rejection of values which its 
members ordinarily share. Done by scientists, the result 
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would be the end of their science, and the Lysenko case 
suggests that it would be .... If the specialists' group 
behaves as a mob, renouncing its normal values, then science 
is already past saving" (Kuhn 1970b:263). For Kuhn, then, 
the indeterminacy of values neither warrants their 
rejection, nor indicates their practical uselessness and 
utter ineffectiveness. Furthermore, in the conflict between 
paradigms, science itself is not at stake, although the 
nature of a particular science may be. 1 If scientists act 
like a mob, science would not be "at stake," it would 
already be at an end and past saving. Finally, if the 
decisions made during conflicts are given only a "historical 
character," or "are made only with 'hindsight,'" such that 
we can only reconstruct the results from the perspective of 
the victors, then the function of values within the process-
-upon which Kuhn insists--is denied, and one is left with 
Caputo's nebulous "free argument." 
Concerning the second point, for Kuhn might does not 
make right. Caputo's interpretation puts great weight upon 
the statement in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
that normal science is "a strenuous and devoted attempt to 
force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by 
1 As we will see, part of Blumenberg's contribution 
to the issue is that, even if science were somehow at stake 
at this level, there would still remain a continuity of 
formal, indeterminate positions which do initially exercise 
a determinate influence--by taking on a specific meaning 
content. 
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professional education" (Kuhn 1970:5). Later in that work 
Kuhn weakens the claim somewhat, claiming that "that 
enterprise seems an attempt to force nature into the 
preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
supplies" (24). However, Caputo overlooks certain other 
attempts made by Kuhn to clarify his position. Kuhn denies 
that scientists "first decide what they agree about and then 
enforce it both on their colleagues and on nature" (Kuhn 
1970b:260). 
Later in the same essay Kuhn states, 
By the same token, no part of the argument here or 
in my book implies that scientists may choose any 
theory they like so long as they agree in their 
choice and thereafter enforce it. Most of the 
puzzles of normal science are directly presented by 
nature, and all involve nature indirectly. Though 
different solutions have been received as valid at 
different times, nature cannot be forced into an 
arbitrary set of conceptual boxes. On the contrary, 
the history of proto-science shows that normal 
science is possible only with very special boxes, 
and the history of developed science shows that 
nature will not indefinitely be confined in any set 
which scientists have constructed so far. (Kuhn 
1970b:263) 
Kuhn's position is either incoherent or more complex and 
delicate than Caputo suggests. 
Rather than seeking a balance between Gadamer and 
Derrida, it might now appear that Kuhn's position is not 
only proximal to Gadamer's, but actually squares with it. 
If the shared values are not rejected, then whereof does one 
speak of "crisis?" Are scientific values a firm underlayer 
of support, so that crisis (or revolution) is only a 
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surface-level phenomenon, or perhaps even only the 
proverbial "matter of (subjective) perception?" What makes 
Kuhn's position on values any different from that of 
Gadamer? What led Caputo, moreover, to believe that for 
Kuhn such values were utterly ineffective and of no 
practical use? Could Caputo have been so mistaken about 
Kuhn's position? 
The mistake may lie in Caputo's characterization of 
utter ineffectiveness. For Kuhn, the values are not utterly 
ineffective, although they may not be persistently and 
substantially effective in their applications within 
scientific practice. Both the mistake of Caputo's 
interpretation and the difference from Gadamer's position 
rests in the problem of the function of values. The 
indeterminacy of values does not simply warrant their 
rejection. Such indeterminacy, rather, must lead one to 
focus on their function both within normal science and the 
crisis situation. The shared values upon which phronesis 
draws have an "abstract-universal" moment (ala Hegel)--but 
the determination of their meaning carried out independently 
of a given historical moment or scientific community is not 
very full or rich. 
More importantly, a focus on the "substantive" 
development over time of a particular value's meaning cannot 
account for all the specific determinations made through 
that time frame. One must turn to the function of the value 
86 
within the process of deliberation and decision in order to 
uncover the rationality operative in scientific activity, as 
well as the place of values within it. So, for example, a 
"dogmatic" stance--whether about a theory or a value--is not 
simply adopted at will, but rather serves a necessary 
function within scientific activity. Although Kuhn 
sometimes speaks of this function as "only" a strategy, he 
also claims that it is essential to scientific activity and 
progress. As essential, it is not "simply" a sociological 
characterization of cormnunity-structure. The function 
dictates the adoption, not only of the "dogmatic" attitude 
characteristic of normal science, but of the "crisis" 
attitude as well. 
How then does Kuhn's position differ from Gadamer's? 
Fundamentally in that Gadamer's hermeneutics leaves little 
room for the deployment of idea of revolution. Kuhn does 
account for the possibility of crises in the identity of the 
cormnunity (tradition) and revolutionary re-constitutions of 
such identity (as well as of the values which will guide 
that cormnunity). However, such a crisis does not mean that 
the values once shared by the cormnunity have become utterly 
ineffective. Instead, as Blumenberg suggests, they now 
gravitate around positions central to determining what the 
cormnunity was (what the old paradigm was--what content 
occupied these positions), and what the new community 
purports to be (what content now reoccupies these 
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positions). In short, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
the kind of meaning-content that comes to occupy a 
particular position--the kind of substitution that becomes 
possible (and which is part of the meaning of the word 
"paradigm")--can have a revolutionary effect on the 
application of values (their selection and specification) . 
The challenges issuing from both Gadamer's and 
Derrida's positions should now be clear. Kuhn's attempt to 
maintain a balance which incorporates both stability and 
instability into the process of scientific activity is 
challenged from both sides: by the position which sees all 
such stability as imposed violence, and by the position 
which sees any such instability as something considerably 
less than crisis. 
Gadamer's Analysis of the Structure of Experience 
Two sections of Truth and Method are particularly 
important for showing how both normal (and revolutionary) 
science involve experiences that both falsify and confirm 
various aspects of tradition--such that confidence in 
tradition is not simply affirmed dogmatically, without 
reasons, but is confirmed by continuing experience. 8 The 
first section, "The Concept of Experience and the Essence of 
the Hermeneutic Experience," develops Gadamer's 
a I ref er the reader here to the discussion at the end 
of the last chapter. 
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understanding of the "negativity" of experience. The second 
section, "The Model of Platonic Dialectic," develops the 
idea of an "openness to" experience, provoked by its 
essential negativity, by means of the articulation of a 
model of critical dialogue. In short, the falsification and 
confirmation of tradition is an achievement of dialogue. 
According to Gadamer, the process of experience is 
essentially negative (353) . In this regard Gadamer himself 
acknowledges a relationship to Popper's idea of conjecture 
and refutation (353n.299). The word "experience" has two 
different senses for us in everyday use: there are the 
experiences that conform to our expectations, and the new 
experiences that occur to us. The former sense of 
experience relates to repetition and confirmation. These 
allow us to predict what was previously unexpected. The 
latter sense of experience--the sense Gadamer calls 
11 genuine 11 --is the negative sense: the sense which affirms 
that our expectations are violated. Gadamer says, "If a new 
experience of an object occurs to us, this means that 
hietherto we have not seen the thing correctly and now know 
it better. Thus the negativity of experience has a 
curiously productive meaning (353) ." In Popper's terms, one 
learns that one was mistaken. 
New experience is negative experience. "Only something 
different and unexpected can provide someone who has 
experience with a new one (353) ." Negative, productive 
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experience can only occur once. Having occured, at this 
point repetition of the experience supports the negative 
experience. In other words, experience in the former of the 
two senses spoken of above takes over from and confirms 
experience in the latter sense. The "taking over" should be 
understood as a process: experience is engaged in a cycle 
of expectation and violation, of hope and disappointment. 
But Gadamer goes further. Even a cyclical understanding 
of the process of experience might lead one to believe that 
repetition and confirmation is the privileged member in the 
process: "It is true, of course, that part of the nature of 
experience is to be continually confirmed; it is, as it 
were, acquired only by being repeated" (353) . Nevertheless, 
Gadamer says that negative experience is "experience is the 
genuine sense" (353). In other words, negative experience 
is more than a troublesome occasion or obstacle keeping one 
from getting on with the process of repetition. It serves 
as more than a "corrective" to the process. The reason why 
we might see negative experience as only a troublesome 
obstacle, according to Gadamer, is that we are tempted to 
conceive of experience in terms of something that surpasses 
it, or in terms of the end or final state of experience--a 
state in which experience itself would be obviated. Instead 
of succumbing to this temptation, we should see that "the 
truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new 
experience. That is why a person who is called experienced 
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has become so not only through experiences but is also open 
t..Q new experience (355) ." 
The end of experience consists in being experienced. 
Being experienced consists in openness. Being experienced 
means to be open to new experience--expecting violations, 
expecting the unexpected. "The consununation of his 
experience, the perfection that we call "being experienced," 
does not consist in the fact that someone already knows 
everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the 
experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone 
who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many 
experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from 
them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences 
and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its 
proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the 
openness to experience that is made possible by experience 
itself" (355) . Negative experience is "genuine" experience 
insofar as "every experience worthy of the name thwarts an 
expectation (356) ." 
Genuine experience reverts back upon the being of the 
one who is experienced. "Experience is experience of human 
finitude (357) ." It is "that whereby man becomes aware of 
his finiteness (357) ." "Genuine experience is experience of 
one's own historicity (357) ." In negative experience, we 
experience our f initude insofar as our expectations are 
violated, our hopes are disappointed, our plans go 
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unfulfilled. "The experienced man knows that all foresight 
is limited and all plans uncertain (357) ." Gadamer 
continues, 
In him is realized the truth value of experience. If 
it is characteristic of every phase- of the process 
of experience that the experienced person acquires a 
new openness to new experiences, this is certainly 
true of the idea of being perfectly experienced. It 
does not mean that experience has ceased and a 
higher form of knowledge is reached (Hegel), but 
that for the first time experience fully and truly 
is. In it all dogmatism, which proceeds from the 
soaring desires of the human heart, reaches an 
absolute barrier. Experience teaches us to 
acknowledge the real. The genuine result of 
experience, then--as of all desire to know--is to 
know what is. But "what is," here, is not this or 
that thing, but "what cannot be destroyed" (Ranke) 
(357). 
In this passage Gadamer's Popperian affinities shine 
through. 9 The experienced person is the one whose posture 
is open, a stance that could easily be appreciated by the 
author of The Open Society and Its Enemies. Furthermore, 
the result of experience is to know what is, what cannot be 
destroyed--which echoes Popper's structure of conjecture and 
refutation. That which stands against all of our efforts to 
refute it--which remains inviolate--is that which can be 
characterised as what is. 
But more needs to be said about the structure of 
openness, and this can be accomplished by means of a 
9 Although, as pointed out earlier, one must not 
overlook the "suffering side" of experience which Gadamer 
affirms as essential to "openness," one example of which we 
discussed earlier--the openness required to suffer through a 
debate with tradition. 
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question directed at Gadamer's understanding of negative 
experience: Does Gadamer recognize, as Kuhn and Popper do, 
that not every negative experience is falsifying? Of 
course, Gadamer could say that an experience is identifiable 
as negative only if it does falsify, but this would not 
answer the question of how to discriminate between an 
experience which is not falsifying (and yet which could not 
be said to be confirming) and an experience which could be 
said to be falsifying. Could it be that Gadamer's 
interpretation of negative experience remains "naive?" 
Gadamer's analysis of the structure of experience makes 
the claim that negative experience is primary. Genuine 
experience is bilateral: we not only call something into 
question by means of our expectations but we ourselves are 
called into question by the violation of those expectations. 
The transition is thereby made from the analysis of 
experience to the logic of question and answer. 
In the section entitled, "The Model of Platonic 
Dialogue," Gadamer begins an analysis of what he will later 
call the logic of question and answer. Gadamer recognizes 
that what he has characterized as negative experience is a 
variation on what Hegel called determinate negation. But 
Gadamer differs from Hegel insofar as he insists that 
experience does not have "knowledge" as its final state--
that is, the end of experience is not knowledge, and the 
perfection of experience is not perfect knowledge, in which 
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experience would be obviated; rather, the perfection of 
experience is being perfectly experienced, and that means 
being open to experience--knowing that one does not know. 
To help him explicate the logical structure of the openness 
to experience, Gadamer turns to Socrates. 
Being open to experience--knowing that one does not 
know--has the structure of a question. We saw earlier that 
for Gadamer negative experience consists in the violation or 
disappointment of expectations. The question which arose at 
that point was whether Gadamer's understanding of negative 
experience is naive. Gadamer states, 
We cannot have experiences without asking questions. 
Recognizing that an object is different, and not as 
we first thought, obviously presupposes the question 
whether it was this or that. From a logical point 
of view, the openness essential to experience is 
precisely the openness of being either this or that. 
It has the structure of a question. And just as the 
dialectical negativity of experience culminates in 
the idea of being perfectly experienced--i.e., being 
aware of our finitude and limitedness--so also the 
logical form of the question and the negativity that 
is part of it culminate in a radical negativity: 
the knowledge of not knowing. (362} 
We might say then, that the openness characteristic of 
genuine experience represents a moment of hesitation, ~· 
through which we raise a question. It represents an 
intermediate stage between the steady course of old 
expectations that are confirmed and the disconf irmation that 
alters that course. This hesitation indicates that we know 
that we do not know, and this hesitation takes the form of a 
question. Therefore, it is not simply negative experience 
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which calls our expectations into question. 
It is not clear here, however, whether hesitation 
precedes experience or is called forth in experience (or is 
simply the "culmination" of a lifetime of experience) . Does 
one approach every experience with hesitancy, or is it only 
a negative experience that calls forth hesitancy--a 
hesitancy which keeps one from the precipitancy of a hasty 
conclusion? 
Gadamer states that "the structure of the question is 
implicit in all experience. We cannot have experiences 
without asking questions" (362) . This would seem to imply 
that being open to experience means always approaching 
experience with questions. Gadamer follows up with the 
claim, "Recognizing that an object is different, and not as 
we first thought, obviously presupposes the question whether 
it was this or that." Recognizing an experience as 
negative, as a violation, requires that one approach 
experience with questions. One could not recognize 
difference if one was not open to it. In other words, one 
does not first recognize difference or violation, and then 
assume the stance of the questioner. Nor does one first 
recognize difference, and then hesitate, only raising a 
question as the result of such hesitation. 
On one hand, then, we always bring questions to 
experience: we are always open to whether something is this 
or that--we are, that is, open to alternatives. Yet 
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positive experience does not question us in turn; only 
negative experience does. This reciprocal questioning is 
what makes experience genuine, and productive. Being open 
to experience means that one is oriented toward expecting 
the unexpected. What then is the point of hesitancy? It 
keeps one from being precipitant?--It allows alternatives to 
come into view. 
The Model of Platonic Dialogue 
Being open to the negativity of genuine experience 
corresponds, according to Gadamer, to the problem of asking 
questions. The great insight of the Platonic dialogues, 
according to Gadamer, is that they show that it is more 
difficult to ask questions than to give answers. The 
difficulty with asking questions is that one must determine 
which are the right questions to ask. Questions give a 
conversation direction, so the problem is: how can one guide 
the conversation in the right direction. How does one find 
the right questions to ask? Gadamer states, "All 
questioning and desire to know presuppose a knowledge that 
one does not know; so much so, indeed, that a particular 
lack of knowledge leads to a particular question (366) ." 
Being open to what is in question means recognizing that the 
answer is not settled. The answer is questionable. 
Gadamer, therefore, is not espousing "open" questions, if 
"open" is taken to mean questions that are boundless. A 
question must be concretized--it must become a particular 
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question. 
Concretizing the question involves seeing the answer to 
the question as something that is not settled, as something 
that is not "decisive" (363) . Recognizing this means 
recognizing that the answer lacks something. The goal of 
questioning is to find a question which will help one make 
up (at least part of) this lack. 
When Gadamer takes his next step, however, he introduces 
a shift: whereas questioning presupposes .t.hat. one does not 
know, the difficulty that faces the person trying to ask the 
right question "lies in knowing ~ one does not know" 
(366) . If one is going to address a particular lack of 
knowledge through a particular question, then one needs to 
know something of what is lacking about the knowledge (the 
answer) one has available. If a question is not going to be 
a floating question, but is to be concrete or particular, 
then it will have to speak to the available answer. Gadamer 
continues, "Plato shows in an unforgettable way where the 
difficulty lies in knowing what one does not know. It is 
the power of opinion against which it is so hard to obtain 
an admission of ignorance. It is opinion that suppresses 
questions. Opinion has a curious tendency to propagate 
itself .... How, then, can ignorance be admitted and questions 
arise?" (366). 
Gadamer is not saying that opinion is unwilling to admit 
ignorance in general, as a possibility, but rather that it 
is unwilling to admit ignorance at any particular point. 
Opinion may be willing to admit the possibility of error, 
but finds it difficult to identify at what point error 
occurs. It is not so much that opinion suppresses the 
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possibility of questions, so much as opinion suppresses the 
application of any particular question. Gadamer refers to 
this as the "smooth front" of popular opinion: There may be 
many questions, but they are aligned in a front of equal 
urgency; there is no way of determining which among them, if 
any, is the right question to pursue. 
In the face of this situation, Gadamer accounts for the 
way a question arises in the following terms. 
Let us say that [a question] can occur only in the 
way any idea occurs to us. It is true that we do 
speak of ideas occurring to us less in regard to 
questions than to answers--e.g., the solution of 
problems; and by this we mean to say that there is 
no methodical way to arrive at the solution. But we 
also know that such ideas do not occur to us 
entirely uneX,Pectedly. They always presuppose an 
orientation toward an area of openness from which 
the idea can occur--i.e., they presuppose questions. 
The real nature of the sudden idea is perhaps less 
that a solution occurs to us like an answer to a 
riddle than that a question occurs to us that breaks 
through into the open and thereby makes an answer 
possible. Every sudden idea has the structure of a 
question. But the sudden occurrence of the question 
is already a breach in the smooth front of popular 
opinion. Hence we say that a question too "occurs" 
to us, that it "arises" or "presents itself" more 
than that we raise or present it" (366). 
A question, then, breaks through into the open, 
breaching a front. The question overpowers the power of 
opinion to suppress it. But does the occurrence of the 
question open its own critical space? Is it "entirely 
unexpected?" The subtlety of Gadamer's position is worthy 
of investigation. 
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In the passage, Gadamer compares the occurrence of a 
question to the occurrence of an idea. But, as he says, the 
occurrence of an idea presupposes questions. An idea's 
occurrence is not entirely unexpected. Gadamer then 
compares an idea to a question. An idea has the structure 
of a question. But if this is so, then doesn't a question 
which arises in the face of opinion presuppose questions 
already in play (just as an idea presupposes the area of 
openness marked out by questions)? The question which 
arises presupposes other questions. The newly-arisen 
question needs the openness which questions already have 
provided. The questions already in play have provided that 
openness, which makes the appearance of the new question not 
entirely unexpected. 
It seems possible, then, that opinion is not entirely 
closed off to questioning. It is possible that the nature 
of opinion makes room for questions. It is possible that 
the nature of opinion makes it not entirely unexpected that 
questions will arise. Either that, or the questions that 
are already in play have their source elsewhere. But that 
means not only that questions are always already in play, 
opening spaces in opposition to opinion, but even more 
importantly for this discussion it means that Gadamer has 
not accounted for how ignorance is admitted and questions 
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arise. It would seem that ignorance in some sense is always 
admitted and questions have already arisen. But to tie this 
back to our point of departure, this would mean that in some 
sense we already know that we do not know. But would 
admitting ignorance and the existence of questions already 
in play mean that we know, in some sense, what we do not 
know? In terms of Gadamer's concept of experience, would 
even our opinion have experienced negation--so that it is in 
some sense open, wanting to know; or, to take the other 
alternative, despite our opinion, we have experienced 
negation--so that we are in some way in conflict with 
ourselves: the closedness of opinion being in constant 
conflict with the openness of another side of ourselves (the 
side which wants to know}? 
Judging by what Gadamer says, he does recognize a 
conflict between closedness and openness, no matter where 
that conflict might be located. He says, "there is 
something peculiar about this art [of questioning] . We have 
seen that it is reserved to the person who wants to know--
i .e., who already has questions. The art of questioning is 
not the art of resisting the pressure of opinion; it already 
presupposes this freedom" (366} . Questioning arises because 
opinion has already been resisted. So opinion is not 
openness--it does not expect questions or challenges. 
Opinion is not engaged in the search to know. Gadamer 
continues on the next page: "As the art of asking 
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questions, dialectic proves its value because only the 
person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in 
his questioning, which involves being able to preserve his 
orientation toward openness" (367) . Opinion, then, is that 
which threatens to overcome questioning. But the freedom to 
resist this threat--that resists this threat--is always 
presupposed by questioning. Only if we do not persist in 
questioning does the freedom to question become concealed. 
However, Gadamer suggests that such persistence is not 
an easy matter. In fact, it is quite difficult, for he says 
that "only the person who knows how to ask questions is able 
to persist ... " But that is precisely the problem with which 
we began: how does one determine the right questions? Here 
it is no longer sufficient to say that, "A person skilled in 
the 'art' of questioning is a person who can prevent 
questions from being suppressed by the dominant opinion" 
(367) . Prevention of suppression is a rather weak indicator 
of one's knowledge of the art of questioning. In fact, 
there is a circularity here, insofar as Gadamer states that 
only the one who knows how to ask questions will persist, 
and yet the proof of that knowledge is in the persistence of 
questioning in the face of suppression. For Gadamer this 
circularity is not vicious, but rather hermeneutic, and it 
is inherent in all experience: only by being open will we 
truly experience; but, given our situatedness within a 
tradition that constitutes the medium of our experience, it 
is only by experiencing (interpreting, applying), that we 
attain openness toward possibilities. 
How then, does questioning proceed? In this context 
Gadamer affirms, as a condition for genuine dialogue, the 
requirement that the real strength of the other person's 
position must be brought out. He says 
To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to 
be conducted by the subject matter to which the 
partners in the dialogue are oriented. It requires 
that one does not try to argue the other person down 
but that one really considers the weight of the 
other's opinion ...... A person who possesses this art 
[of questioning] will himself search for everything 
in favor of an opinion. Dialectic consists not in 
trying to discover the weakness of what is said, but 
in bringing out its real strength. (367) 
Bringing out the real strength of the other's position 
proceeds by means of a process which legitimates and then 
limits. In other words, one seeks to discover and 
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acknowledge the truth and power of the other's position, but 
then correspondingly delimits the scope and depth of its 
applications. Both movements are part of the determination 
of "real strength." Delimitation, in fact, is the 
determination of the question to which the position is an 
answer--a determination of the question that this answer i.a 
"in a position" to answer. 
Summa:ry 
It may seem odd that Popper and Gadamer would agree that 
genuine criticism (or dialogue) requires one to bring out 
the strengths of the other's position, and yet draw such 
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very different conclusions about the implications of this 
requirement for the possibility of revolution. It would 
seem less odd if one were to take note of the fact that 
Gadamer also sees little promise in the idea of progress. 
The limits of the applicability of Gadamer's hermeneutics to 
Kuhn's philosophy of science may be reached when one runs up 
against this idea. As we have seen throughout this paper, 
the entire issue of the complementarity of tradition and 
revolution is deeply vested in the issue of progress. For 
Popper, scientific advance is achieved through perpetual 
revolutions. Kuhn himself claims that his understanding of 
scientific revolutions is not meant to imply that no claim 
to progress can be made. Gadamer, on the other hand, 
warrants no such deployment of the idea of progress. At 
best tradition is reformed and restored, and parochial 
prejudices are overcome. Experience is not progressive, and 
none of its achievements warrants the name "progress." The 
truth that is appropriated through the critical reception of 
tradition must be won anew by each generation. There is, 
says Gadamer, no progress, but only participation (Gadamer 
1986:6). 
One must turn to Hans Blumenberg to find a hermeneutic 
philosophy that makes room for the idea of progress (though 
as we shall see, it is "relative" progress: progress 
relative to preceding problems) . His position, we will see, 
denies that every overcoming of connnunication breakdown is 
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ultimately only a restoration and reconfirmation of 
tradition, a shedding away of parochial prejudices by means 
of their engagement through dialogue. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
BLUMENBERG'S DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
The last chapter ended at the point where Gadamer 
affirmed, as a condition for genuine dialogue, the 
requirement that the real strength of what the other has 
said must be brought out. Only when interlocutors do not 
focus simply on exposing weaknesses, but instead give due 
weight to the strengths of each other's opinion--that is, 
enter into a genuine conversation--can a conversation be 
properly led by, and oriented to, the matter at issue (.die. 
Sache) handed down by tradition. The question which will be 
addressed by the end of this chapter, however, is: does the 
satisfaction of this requirement actually suppress crises 
and revolutions?1 
Hans Blumenberg develops Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics, I will argue, in the direction of its 
possibilities for underwriting the concepts of crisis and 
1 As we shall see, the "suppression" spoken of here 
does not only pertain to the present--i.e., the suppression 
of our own revolutionary or critical impulses--but also 
pertains to the past: do we, as participants in a 
Gadamerian conversation, suppress our openness to 
revolutiona:r:y phenomena of the past, that is, our openness 
to contrary, dissident voices? Do we perhaps even fail to 
hear the revolutionary, or emancipatory, claims of the 
voices we do attend to? 
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revolution. To support this claim, I will begin the chapter 
by exploring the one facet of Gadamer's position that seems 
to open the space for the kind of operation that is required 
for revolutionary claims--namely, his understanding of the 
"classical." In short, I will forge a link between 
Gadamer's description of the operations of the classic text 
and Blumenberg's description of the operations of a 
revolutionary text. 
Gadamer's concept of the classical, however, has been 
subjected to much criticism. Insofar as Gadamer's idea of 
the classic seems to foster the image of tradition as "a 
self-activating movement of imperishable substances" (Jauss 
1982:64), his position can easily be understood as one which 
makes us ideological supporters of traditions and texts. 2 
The superiority of the classic consists in its privileged 
relationship to the matter at issue, on the basis of which 
privilege it can elicit this matter into presence directly 
before us. Gadamer's position leaves us with little choice, 
according to this criticism, but to submit to such a 
superior power of access. 3 
2 Concerning the ideologcal nature of Gadamer's 
position, see Habermas's "Review of Gadamer's Truth and 
Method" (1990:213-241), and Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a 
Transformation of Philosophy (1980) . 
3 Note the parallels between this criticism of 
Gadamer and that levelled by Popper at Kuhn: 
The 'normal' scientist, in my view, has been 
taught badly. I believe, and so do many others, 
that all teaching on the University level (and if 
possible below} should be training and 
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Whether these criticisms are justified or not, I will 
argue that Blumenberg's position develops Gadamer's 
hermeneutics in a direction which can avoid them, while 
simultaneously affirming the intuitions Gadamer expresses 
about the operations of the classic. This development, 
furthermore, makes way for the deployment of the concept of 
theoretical revolution, which can support and strengthen the 
Kuhnian conception of revolution. 
Gadamer's Understanding of the Classical 
In the section of Truth gnd Method in which he analyzes 
the "Example of the Classical" (Gadamer 1990, 285-90), one 
gets a glimpse of what Gadamer means by the historical 
nature of understanding. He states, "We might say that the 
classical is a truly historical category, precisely because 
it is more than a concept of a period or of a historical 
style, and yet it nevertheless does not try to be the 
concept of a suprahistorical value" (287) . In speaking of 
the classical, one must avoid the two extremes of reducing 
it merely to a style characteristic of a period of history, 
or of projecting it into a "supra-historical" realm. 
Between these extremes lies Gadamer's understanding of the 
essence of the historical. 
encouragement in critical thinking. The 'normal' 
scientist, as described by Kuhn, has been badly 
taught. He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit: 
he is a victim of indoctrination. (Popper 1970:52-
3) 
[The classical] does not refer to a quality that 
we ascribe to particular historical phenomena but 
to a notable mode of being historical: the 
historical process of preservation that, through 
constantly proving itself, allows something true 
to come into being. It is not at all the case, as 
the historical mode of thought would have us 
believe, that the value judgment which accords 
something the status of a classic was in fact 
destroyed by historical reflection and its 
criticism of all teleological construals of the 
process of history. Rather, through this 
criticism the value judgment implicit in the 
concept of the classical acquires a new, special 
legitimacy. The classical is something that 
resists historical criticism because its 
historical dominion, the binding power of the 
validity that is preserved and handed down, 
precedes all historical reflection and continues 
in it. (287) 
The qualitative judgment which describes a text as being 
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"classic" does not identify a suprahistorical quality that 
surpasses ore escapes its historical mode of being. Neither 
does this judgment restrict the "classic" to an expression 
of a particular historical period or style. Instead, the 
"classic" refers to a historical "process of preservation" 
in which the text retains the "binding power of its 
validity" through the movement of history. The power of the 
historicist critique was that it undermined the dogma of 
suprahistorical values. Its weakness, however, was that it 
reduced all valuations to the historical concepts of 
"period" and "style." 
Gadamer is not a traditional historicist, although 
he maintains the importance of the mode of being historical. 
For him, the qualitative judgment which describes a text as 
"classic" recognizes that, precisely through the historical 
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process and ge. a historical phenomenon, the "classic" 
presents itself to consciousness as "something enduring," 
which "preserves itself precisely because it is significant 
in itself and interprets itself"--"it says something to the 
present as if it were said specifically to it." The text 
presents a "signficance that cannot be lost and that is 
independent of all the circumstances of time--a kind of 
timeless present that is contemporaneous with every other 
present." Gadamer goes so far as to say that, "the 
classical, then, is certainly something 'timeless,' but this 
timelessness is a mode of historical being" (288, 290). 
Gadamer is struggling to articulate a position 
between the alternatives of the 11 suprahistorical 11 and the 
"historicist."4 To that end he uses language borrowed from 
the tradition of each, even when it leads to paradoxical 
formulations or prima facie contradictions. Only by 
recognizing his struggle can one attempt to understand a 
4 The term "historicist" means something different 
for Gadamer than it does for Popper. By "historicism" 
Gadamer understands the tradition represented by someone 
like Dilthey, for whom the task of historical understanding 
would involve the recovery or reconstruction of the original 
life-world of a particular historical agent, having as its 
aim understanding that agent as she understood herself. As 
I suggested in the last chapter, the self-transposition that 
is required by this task arises from the attempt to overcome 
our foreignness with respect to the past. The negation of 
temporal distance, which the accomplishment of this task 
implies, follows upon the negative evaluation of such 
distance as being only an obstacle to understanding. A 
central feature of Gadamer's hermeneutics (a feature he 
shares with Kuhn, as I pointed out earlier) is the 
affirmation of temporal distance as a condition enabling 
understanding, not simply blocking it. 
statement like, "timelessness is a mode of historical 
being," as being something other than nonsense. 
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The complexity of his struggle is indicated by the 
use he makes of the concept of the "world" of the classical 
and our "belonging" to it (290) . In positing the classical 
phenomenon as being historical, Gadamer fights against the 
historicist tendency (characteristic of Dilthey) to reduce 
the understanding of that phenomenon to the reconstruction 
of a past world. "Our understanding, " he states, "will 
always retain the consciousness that we too belong to that 
world, and correlatively, that the work too belongs to our 
world" (290) . Because Gadamer wants to recognize the 
"constitutive" character of the historical without being 
historicist, and simultaneously recognize the "timelessness" 
of the classical without resorting to the suprahistorical, 
he interprets the "world" of the classical in a manner which 
permits the needed elements of each extreme to function 
together--specifically, the "process-like" character of the 
historical and the "self-preserving" character of the 
suprahistorical are conjoined in our recognition of the 
"classical" world. This "world" is subject to historical 
processes, and yet is preserved in its historical mode of 
being, such that this world is also "our" world. The 
classical proves itself through a process of preservation 
that "speaks directly" to past and present "worlds." In 
fact, this power to speak directly is "fundamentally 
110 
unlimited" (290) . 
This exposition of Gadamer's position may be 
misleading, however, insofar as the stress has been placed 
too heavily on the "objective" side of the problem. "World" 
should not be understood as an "object"--especially as a 
"historical object" for historical consciousness. 5 Such an 
understanding would lead back once more to either the 
suprahistorical extreme or the historicist extreme, each of 
which Gadamer wants to avoid. To that extent, both the 
suprahistorical and the historicist positions stem from a 
corrunon objectivism. Central to Gadamer's struggle to avoid 
this objectivism is the idea of "belonging." 
He says, for example, that "cultural consciousness 
manifests an ultimate corrununity and sharing with the world 
from which a classical work speaks" (290) . This world, for 
consciousness, is something in which we "share" and with 
which we are in "corrununity." It is not first of all an 
object over against us. The world is carried along with the 
work, and the work opens its world before it. We belong to 
that world just as the work belongs to our world. The 
historical movement which constitutes "belonging," in fact, 
characterizes understanding itself. "Understanding is to be 
thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in 
5 To understand the world as an "object" is a 
symptom, in Gadamer's mind, of the objectivism 
characteristic of the Enlightenment. For additional 
corrunents, the reader is referred back to the introduction of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics at the beginning of Chapter Three. 
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an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which 
past and present are constantly mediated" (290) . 
Understanding participates and shares in a process of 
transmission--it is neither the intuition of a 
suprahistorical realm nor the objective delineation of 
unique historical periods. Both alternatives rest upon the 
supposition of human nature as an "unhistorical substratum." 
Therefore, not only does the classic refer to a "notable 
mode of being historical," but human nature itself refers to 
a "notable mode of being historical" (287). Both the 
classic and the human stand between the suprahistorical and 
historicist extremes. 
This, then, gives one some idea of what Gadamer 
means by the idea of "belonging." The classic text, its 
world, our world, we ourselves belong to a tradition--a 
process of transmission in which each of these elements is 
constantly "mediated." This idea of "mediation" tempers the 
power of a text to "speak directly." Attributing such power 
to a text may lead to the misunderstandings of the 
suprahistorical extreme. The classic text may speak 
directly to our world because it belongs to our world--
because it belongs to a process of transmission in which our 
world also shares and participates. But the "voice" of the 
text must be mediated for our understanding through the 
activity of our understanding. In other words, our 
understanding is not passive. 
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In this regard Gadamer appeals to the "hermeneutic 
circle." In the hermeneutic circle, our understanding is 
active in anticipating the meaning of the text. Such 
anticipations, however, do not originate in an activity of 
subjectivity, but rather proceed "from the conunonality that 
binds us to the tradition" (293} . The anticipatory activity 
of understanding, therefore, is a projection of meaning--but 
such projection is grounded upon the appropriation of the 
possibilities inherent within the tradition. In short, our 
understanding both appropriates meanings from the tradition 
and projects meanings upon the traditionary text. In so 
doing, our understanding "participate[s] in the evolution of 
tradition, and hence further determine[s] it" (293}. For 
Gadamer, then, tradition is not a "permanent precondition," 
but is a process of transmission in which we participate and 
which we produce. 
Problems with Gadamer•s Model of the Classical 
Critics such as Hans Robert Jauss (1982} have 
identified two main problems with Gadamer's concept of the 
classical: First, on this understanding of the classic, it 
would seem that the address the classic text makes to us 
stands outside of the logic of question and answer that 
Gadamer is at such pains to demonstrate. The classic text 
would be different from other texts insofar as the 
interpreter would not need to "seek" the question to which 
the text itself is the answer--the question would seem to 
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have always already delivered and validated itself as a 
matter with which we should be concerned. Second, this 
understanding of the classic conflicts with his own 
conception of the role of effective history in 
understanding. Specifically, in so elevating the status of 
the classic, does not Gadamer undermine the tension--that 
is, the temporal distance6 --between the text and the 
present that he affirms for the relationship of every other 
text to a present? (Jauss 1982:29-32) 
Gadamer's possible response might begin by rejecting 
the suggestion that, in appropriating the classic, we turn 
directly to it for answers to our questions. Not only is 
Gadamer sensitive to questions of anachronism (reading 
things back into the past in order to make that past seem 
less foreign) and distortion (ripping the text out of its 
historical horizon so that it may be free to speak to us), 
he is also not suggesting that our relationship to any text 
--classic or traditionary--is primarily "therapeutic. 111 If 
the classic still has something to say to us, then its 
6 We saw earlier that Gadamer considers temporal 
distance to be not merely an obstacle to understanding (and 
a cause of communication breakdown), but an enabling 
condition. The peculiar nature of temporal distance 
therefore makes it a productive ground for understanding. 
The criticism forwarded here is that Gadamer is forsaking 
the productivity for understanding of a tension he affirms 
elsewhere. 
1 By "therapeutic" I mean the suggestion that a 
classic serves us best when it aids us in treating the 
questions that trouble us. 
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claims do not simply provide answers to our questions. When 
Gadamer says that the classical says something to us as if 
it were said specifically to us, he is not suggesting that 
the classic text speaks directly to our questions. In a 
sense, our questions are inappropriate if we use them as the 
means to directly hear the classic text in the claim it 
wants to make (although one should keep in mind here 
Gadamer's analysis of "prejudice"). Therefore, the 
"classic" status of a text is not definable as: "the text's 
ability to speak directly and meaningfully to our present-
day questions and concerns." The classic is no more capable 
of this than is any traditionary text. What, then, is the 
classic status of the text? 
A classic text is a text which consistently 
demonstrates its power to question us directly. The 
classic, I would suggest, can even overpower its effective 
history insofar as that effective history stands between us 
and the text. The classical, then, is different from 
traditionary texts insofar as it operates despite the 
operations of its effective history. It speaks directly to 
the present. The classic breaks down effective history's 
grip upon us (although that operation is itself a re-
affirmation of the text's effectivity, and thus its 
effective history) . 
If this is the way that Gadamer can be understood, 
however, then other questions begin to arise. Specifically, 
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it begins to appear that Gadamer is claiming that a classic 
text uproots us from our own concerns and forces its own 
claims upon us--our response to which can only be 
submission. It is a provocation to which we must respond. 8 
The classic text, it would seem, enjoys its own relationship 
to truth, which may generate a revolutionary response on our 
part. In breaking down tradition, the classic is actually 
breaking down that which first conditions our cares and 
concerns about what matters (die Sache) . 
Gadamer himself would probably be more comfortable with 
a somewhat weaker claim: what actually occurs is that the 
classic text "delivers" die Sache--the matter at issue--to 
us. Nevertheless, rather than participating with us in a 
dialogue led by what is at issue, on this reading the 
classic text would demonstrate its superiority and power by 
this capacity to elicit die Sache into presence. How are we 
to account for this power? How is this power of delivery 
compatible with the other aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics: 
those which, for example, stress the process of dialogue and 
mediation? On this reading our understanding of the classic 
achieves a mediation that has not been required to suffer 
8 This description of the operations of a classic 
text bears a striking similarity to Popper's reference to 
the "problem" that conditions our revolutionary conjectures. 
The similarity to Kuhn is not nearly as striking: Kuhn's 
reference to normal science generating "anomalies" that may 
provoke crisis and revolutionary responses is comparable, 
but, as we shall see, it is more compatible with 
Blumenberg's position. 
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the pains of the process--although it was precisely this 
which is demanded of Popper! 
Does Gadamer threaten the integrity of his own 
hermeneutics? It may very well be that he has introduced an 
unnecessary tension between two claims that, from another 
perspective, are more compatible than may immediately be 
realized. If Gadamer has distinguished too cleanly between 
the operations of classical texts and those of traditionary 
texts (1990:577), then it may be because the threat he 
perceives is the kind of historicism that makes them 
indistinguishable once more. 
Hans Blumenberg's work, I suggest, offers a remedy to 
this unnecessary tension. His position distinguishes 
between a classic and a traditionary text insofar as the 
former can provoke a revolutionary response, whereas merely 
traditionary texts provoke responses that fall within the 
parameters of "normal" research (either scientific or 
interpretive) . 9 However, our understanding of both kinds 
9 Hannah Arendt makes a similar claim in Qn 
Revolution (1990) [I will discuss other overlaps between 
Arendt and Blumenberg later in this chapter] . Note David 
Ingram's interpretation of Arendt's claim: 
If ... we look to the past of a particular culture 
for guidance, it is a past that, in the words of 
Arendt, exemplifies something universal. This 
timeless past can be invoked by revolutionaries to 
liberate the present from an oppressive and 
parochial past. (Ingram 1995: 357) 
Arendt herself speaks at one point of the "definite, though 
undefined" past to which the American revolutionary Thomas 
Paine appealed as authorizing "revolution" (1990:45). 
of text still requires the operation of the logic of 
question and answer. How does Blumenberg carry this out? 
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We can forward two versions--a strong and a weak--of 
Blumenberg's general claim, in terms still very close to 
those of Gadamer, in order to get a sense of his development 
of this issue. The strong version would say that it is not 
that Plato, for example, speaks to us only through, or as 
conditioned by, tradition, but also speaks despite the 
tradition that normally mediates our understanding. The 
weaker version would suggest that Plato can still take a 
meaningful stance within the context of die Sache, a stance 
that is not simply a repetition of what we have already 
taken him to say. Said more positively: we can still 
discover an element in Plato that wants to say something 
over and above what the tradition has already taken him to 
have said. Both versions express the claim that Plato can 
speak to us despite tradition, but with important 
differences. 
For Blumenberg, the undiscovered element in Plato is 
not a case of surplus meaning, unless we mean by that only 
that Plato remains a conversation partner whose position is 
never wholly taken up into, nor rejected from, our own. He 
remains a conversation partner who opposes us, yet opposes 
under the guidance of a matter at issue in which we too 
"participate". Plato therefore challenges our understanding 
of the issue--and the more he challenges the more he 
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undermines, deflects, and transforms his own effective 
history (which itself has conditioned our understanding both 
of the issue and of his position on the issue) . 
This way of stating things is noteworthy if for no 
other reason than it points out the "negative" aspect of 
tradition and effective history. 10 Effective history can 
stand between us and the claims of die Sache as much as 
enable us to hear that claim. 11 Similarly, when Gadamer 
claims that we are not emancipated from effective history 
simply by being made conscious of it, that does not mean 
that "emancipation" is thereby excluded from Gadamer's 
lexicon (Gadamer 1976:34). In light of Gadamer's 
appreciation for the negativity of experience, it may be 
more accurate to say that tradition is at least as much a 
handing down of falsified understanding as it is a handing 
down of beliefs we would like to confirm. 
10 Some interpreters have portrayed Gadamer as having 
an exclusively, or at least excessively, rosy picture of 
tradition. But the aspects which indicate that effective 
history is sometimes operated against--even if it is not a 
condition from which we could be totally emancipated--point 
to a more balanced view of Gadamer. If Gadamer can be 
credited with a rehabilitation of effective history, this 
should not be taken to mean that the enabling function of 
effective history for understanding is now its exclusive 
function. An exclusively "enabling" function too easily 
legitimates an "appreciation" for the past that could so 
"charm" or "captivate" us that we quickly find ourselves 
submitting to the concerns of that past. {Although Gadamer 
does use these terms (1990:490). 
11 As Paul Ricoeur points out in "The Hermeneutical 
Function of Distanciation (1973), some critical distance is 
required. 
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There is then, in all of this, a considerable overlap 
between Blumenberg and Gadamer. Blumenberg does not so much 
oppose Gadamer as develop aspects of his position12 --
particularly those which are required for his answer to the 
question: how is the matter elicited by the classic text 
validated as a matter with which we too should be concerned? 
Specifically, Blumenberg develops the logic of question and 
answer (provocation/response) through two means: the 
concept of "reoccupation" (Umbesetzung)--which I will 
introduce in the next section--and the claim that the 
history of what led up to an event conditions the history of 
its effects (Vorgeschichte conditions Wirkungsgeschichte) . 
The Logic of Question and Answer as 
a Process of Reoccupation 
Blumenberg's concept of "reoccupation," I suggest, 
should be understood as the result of applying the model of 
dialogue to historiography. Gadamer's understanding of the 
logic of question and answer has, as a fundamental 
principle, the idea that due weight should be given to the 
12 Although mention should be made of their "debate" 
over Blumenberg's critique of the secularization thesis in 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. See Gadamer's review in 
Philosophische Rundschau 15 (1968), 201-209. Blumenberg's 
response has been incorporated into the latest English 
translation of Legitimacy (1983) . 
In addition, as I shall point out in more detail 
shortly, in Work on Myth (1985), Blumenberg relates 
favorably to the "aesthetic of reception" of Hans Robert 
Jauss, a student of Gadamer's. In The Genesis of the 
CQPernican World (1987), Blumenberg puts tremendous emphasis 
on the idea of "reception." 
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strengths of another's position. "Reoccupation" is deployed 
to account for the consequences for inquiry when inquiry 
attempts to abide by this dialogical principle. What does 
Blumenberg mean by reoccupation? 
All change, all succession from old to new, 
is accessible to us only in that it can be 
related--instead of to the "substance" of which 
Kant speaks--to a constant frame of reference, by 
whose means the requirements can be defined that 
have to be satisfied in an identical "position." 
That what is new in history cannot be arbitrary in 
each case, but rather is subject to a rigor of 
expectations and needs, is the condition of our 
being able to have such a thing as "cognition" of 
history at all. The concept of "reoccupation" 
designates, by implication, the minimum of 
identity that it must be possible to discover, or 
at least to presuppose and to search for, in even 
the most agitated movement of history. In the 
case of systems of "notions of man and world" 
(Welt- und Menschenansicht: Goethe), 
"reoccupation" means that different statements can 
be understood as answers to identical questions. 
(Blumenberg 1983, 466) 
So reoccupation is first and foremost a category of 
continuity--the attempt to discover a minimum of 
identity . 13 This identity, furthermore, is to be 
understood in terms of the relationship between question and 
answer--that is, dialogically. What is new in history is 
subject to a rigor of expectations--that is, it must be 
understood as an answer to a particular question. 
It is instructive for our purposes to note that when 
Blumenberg first uses the term "reoccupation" in The 
13 Recall Blumenberg's critique of Kuhn's concept of 
"scientific revolution," mentioned in Chapter One 
(Blumenberg 1983:465). "Reoccupation" is intended to 
fulfill the requirements Blumenberg demands of Kuhn. 
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Legitimacy of the Modern Age, he opposes it to the idea of 
"transposition" that is at the heart of the secularization 
theory of Karl Lowith. 
What mainly occurred in the process that is 
interpreted as secularization, at least (so far) 
in all but a few recognizable and specific 
instances, should be described not as the 
transposition [Umsetzung] of authentically 
theological contents into secularized alienation 
from their origin but rather as the reoccupation 
[UTI!besetzung] of answer positions that had become 
vacant and whose corresponding questions could not 
be eliminated. (Blumenberg 1983, 65) 
One should note that Blumenberg does not use the word 
Versetzung [displacement] to make his claim. Displacement 
is not flexible enough to bear the nuance Blumenberg 
intends, since it too exclusively implies "supplanting" or 
"actively removing." This is not to say, however, that 
UTI!besetzung does not carry a sense of "displacement," for it 
can also be translated as "reshuffling." The deployment of 
the term "UTI!besetzung", I would suggest, is intentionally 
ambiguous. Blumenberg plays of the dual sense of 
reoccupation and reshuffling. "Reoccupation" implies the 
satisfaction of obligations that are imposed upon us--a 
"problem-pressure," as he puts it, from which we cannot 
simply escape (Blumenberg 1983:48, 64ff). "Reshuffling," on 
the other hand, implies activity on the part of the 
recipient of such questions. 
The operations of this duality can be understood better 
by linking them up to our earlier problem: the operations 
of the classic text. What Blumenberg's position suggests is 
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that the operations of such a classic text can be 
differentiated depending upon from which of two perspectives 
those operations are approached. One perspective would 
understand the operations of the classic as that which 
perpetually overwhelms and displaces our concerns by means 
of a claim upon what should be our "real" concerns. The 
second perspective would understand the operations of the 
classic as that which perpetually proves itself capable of 
speaking to our concerns (i.e., to the particular problems 
the tradition faces in its understanding of die Sache) . The 
operations of the classic, then, will be variably evaluated, 
given the difference between these perspectives. 
What the concept of Umbesetzung allows us to see, is 
that the operations concealed by one perspective are 
revealed by the other: From the perspective that sees the 
classic text primarily as an innovative claim that disrupts 
our concerns, and attempts to replace these concerns with 
its own determination of what is--or should properly be--at 
issue, what gets concealed is the way that such disruptions 
(Popperian conjectures) may actually contribute to a 
proliferation of questions, rather than an amputation of 
questions that would allow easy access to the matter at 
issue. Such proliferation :mgy actually serve to block 
access rather than guarantee it. From the perspective that 
sees the classic text primarily as a pre-eminent 
traditionary text, on the other hand, the uncovering of a 
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hitherto unsuspected element of substantive meaning--which 
thereby contributes to the totality of its effective 
history--conceals the "shift" that Blumenberg calls 
"Urnbesetzung." Particular questions--some of which were 
raised only because the text was supposed to have been 
capable of being applied to them, and thus of answering 
them--are reoccupied with new answers. What gives the 
appearance of a continuity in content is actually a 
continuity in the framework of answer positions. 
When the classic text is seen primarily as disruptive 
of our concerns--as revolutionary--then it is easy to think 
of Urnbesetzung as simply a displacement of one set of 
concerns by another set which now claims to be that which 
should occupy us. But how can such a displacement take 
place? Does the classic miraculously produce these new 
concerns like a magician pulls a rabbit out of a hat? What 
would create the conditions for our "enchantment" here?14 
On the other hand, when the classic text is seen 
primarily as speaking directly to us in our concerns--as 
pre-eminent in our tradition--then the "preservation" of 
these concerns of ours by means of the classic's operations 
can too easily be understood--if it involves any change at 
all--as at most a transformation, modification, or 
14 The term "enchantment" is taken from Georgia 
Warnke's critique of Gadamer's concept of the classical. 
Gadamer: Hermeneutics. Tradition and Reason (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1987), 106. 
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development in content, motivated by the acknowledgement and 
appropriation of the new claims. But at this point appear 
the two threats I mentioned earlier, which both arise from 
the failure to be sufficiently critical of our standards for 
concern: anachronism and distortion. 
With the idea of "Umbesetzung," Blumenberg is 
attempting to overcome the weaknesses of both of these 
positions. In so doing, he draws our attention to the 
determinations we have made about our concerns--that is, to 
the answers we have given to the questions that concern us. 
Questions do not always precede their answers, says 
Blumenberg. 
We are going to have to free ourselves from the 
idea that there is a firm canon of the "great 
questions" that throughout history and with an 
unchanging urgency have occupied human curiosity 
and motivated the pretension to world and self-
interpretation. Such a canon would explain the 
changing systems of mythology, theology, and 
philosophy by the congruence of their output of 
assertions with its content of questions. (65-6) 
Blumenberg's comment suggests that we should not always 
be led by the approach which evaluates answers only as 
alternative to a particular question. In other words, we 
should not simply ask: which answer is better to this 
question? We sometimes need to ask: to what question does 
this answer function as an answer? If the claim made by the 
answer is to be preserved, it will be preserved only insofar 
as it functions as an answer to a question--or, can still 
function as an answer to a question. 
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The idea Blumenberg is driving at, then, is that an 
answer position within a framework of questions may be 
"preserved," but now it is understood "better": it may now 
be seen to serve a different function within the interplay 
of questions than it was understood to have served; and its 
answer may serve as an answer to a different question, or 
serve a different application. 
In short, the issue with which we understood a text to 
be concerned--the issue concerning which the claims of the 
text were made--can receive a new determination, insofar as 
the answer the text is understood to be providing itself can 
receive a new determination. It can thus be with a 
fundamentally new interplay of issues that the text is seen 
as being concerned. 
Sunnnary 
Insofar as the purpose of this section was only to 
introduce Blumenberg's concept of "Umbesetzung" as a 
development of the logic of question and answer, these last 
connnents should be understood as anticipations. The purpose 
of Blumenberg•s development of the logic of question and 
answer, which has not yet been achieved, is to answer how 
the matter at issue elicited by the classic text could be 
validated as a matter with which we also are/should be 
concerned. To this point, the dual sense of Umbesetzung as 
reoccupation/reshuffling has been highlighted, a duality 
which attempts to forge a path between the two 
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understandings of the operation of the classical from which 
both Gadamer and Blumenberg want to distance themselves. 
The prima:r:y purpose for which the concept of Umbesetzung is 
deployed--to account for the consequences for inquiry when 
inquiry attempts to abide by the dialogical principle that 
due weight should be given to the strengths of the other's 
position--still needs to be explained. Thus far, only its 
function in identifying the continuity of answer positions 
has been considered. Only after the next section can the 
concept be developed fully. 
The History of What Led to a Text's Appearance 
Conditions the Histo:r:y of Its Effects 
The title of this section can be re-stated as: Pre-
history Cvorgeschichte) Conditions Effective History 
{Wirkungsgeschichte) . This is a central claim made by 
Blumenberg, and it needs to be understood in conjunction 
with the idea of reoccupation. The upshot of the last 
section was that a classic text can be revolutionary--as 
long as the claims it makes fill {reoccupy) the positions of 
the questions {and answers) it disrupts. In other words, 
even a revolutionary text does not simply, or 
straightforwardly "disrupt." It does not generate, or self-
activate, its own, authoritative, effective history. There 
are conditions for such disruptions--conditions for the 
possibility of the text's reception, of the text's effects. 
Blumenberg's claim is that the history of what leads up to a 
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text's reception conditions its effects. 
The phrase is itself taken from the title of one of the 
chapters of Blumenberg's book, The Genesis of the Copernican 
World (1987) . Blumenberg states the nature of his concern: 
My objective was to show that in the history of 
philosophical thought and of its role in the 
foundation of modern science it cannot only be a 
matter of presenting the derivation and 
development of particular ideas and hypotheses, 
and of bringing to light what stimulated them, and 
their early forms. Instead, we need to begin one 
level lower, with the origin of the scope or 
latitude in which those new conceptions first 
became possible at all, and within which both the 
affinities that gave them an effect and the means 
by which to formulate them arose. (my stress) 
(Blumenberg, 1987: 167) 
Blumenberg is here challenging the hegemony of "histories of 
influence," which attempt to narrativize the origin and 
development of particular theories by searching for 
prototypes and forerunners whose ideas often "take hold" in 
dramatic--though for that very reason often inexplicable--
fashion. These same narratives also search for the 
appearance of key words or names, and take these appearances 
as evidence of "effects" justifying the continuation of the 
narrative. Blumenberg's logic of question and answer 
rejects the idea that a narrative of how theories are 
generated and "progress" is sufficient. He claims that his 
own approach 
... does not answer the question as to how the 
Copernican system arose. It only removes the 
isolation of that issue from the preconditions of 
the fact that Copernicus did not become the 
Aristarchus of the sixteenth century, a thinker 
without any effect. (167) 
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It is understanding precisely .thi..s. lack of effect which is 
central to Blumenberg's concerns. 
Our subject is ..... the conditions of the 
possibility of the fact that there is any such 
thing as a history of Copernicus's effects--which 
is by no means a matter of course, since there had 
not been such a history in the case of Aristarchus 
of Samos. (131) 
The task is to identify the background conditions 
of the assurance that enabled Copernicus to have 
any expectation at all that his readers would 
consent to the work's full claim to truth ..... How 
could he, for his part, avoid his forerunners' and 
predecessors' manifest failure of encountering an 
audience that is not only uncomprehending but 
committed to incompatible assumptions? (128) 
First and foremost the claim that pre-history 
conditions effective history affirms the importance of the 
logic of question and answer for our understanding of texts 
--particularly "classic," or "revolutionary" texts. By 
means of this phrase, Blumenberg suggests that a classic 
text does not respond only to a determinate set of problems, 
but in fact responds also to a broader horizon of 
expectations. 15 The classic text operates both upon the 
determinate questions to which it responds, and the horizon 
of expectations to which it brings its own claims. In a way 
that still needs to be explained, it is by these means that 
the text serves not only as a source of answers, but also as 
a source of new questions--which constitute its effects. 
It is important to note at this point that these new 
15 This horizon of expectations relates to what was 
earlier called the "strength" of the other's position--what 
Popper calls "the real power of a theory." 
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questions do not just open "in front" of the text. The 
classic text opens up questions both in front of itself and 
behind itself. The pre-history of a text, then, conditions 
what that text opens both in front of itself and behind 
itself. Pre-history does not just condition the effects the 
text may have on the future--it does not just condition the 
questions it directs to the future. It also conditions the 
effects the text may have in opening new insights into the 
past--that is, in directing new questions at the past, or to 
the past, or even in opening a conversation with voices of 
the past that have been silent (or silenced) . 16 The 
effective history of a text, then, in a sense operates 
forward and backward. It not only opens a future for us 
through the questions it directs to us, but also opens the 
past (for us as well) through the questions it directs to 
us. 
The matter at issue which the text thus elicits into 
presence is a fundamentally "new" matter, not only (or even 
16 Parallels to numerous thinkers present themselves 
here. For example, this aspect of Blumenberg's position 
(and, in fact, much of the entire idea of reoccupation) is 
shared with Arendt: emancipation can operate 
retrospectively. The insights mentioned here do not need to 
be so dramatic, of course. Paul Ricoeur, referring both to 
Jauss and (somewhat more indirectly) to Blumenberg, provides 
another kind of example: 
It is after the fact, by a recoil-effect of 
Mallarme's lyrical hermeticism, that we are able 
to release virtual meanings in baroque poetry that 
had hitherto remained unnoticed. (Ricoeur 
1988:172) 
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primarily) because it is directed to our age, but because it 
opens its own age and previous ages to us in new ways--i.e., 
raises new questions that can be directed at that age. 
What is accomplished, then, is a renewal of the 
concerns of the past--but not in the sense that these 
concerns are directly validated for us; rather, these 
concerns are raised as questions for us, in the sense that 
they are not something from which we can simply "break" or 
move forward, because we are not clear about what it is from 
which we are distinguishing ourselves. We cannot "surpass" 
it unless and until we know what it is that is being 
"surpassed." In this sense, then, "crisis" is not a 
"conflict" of interpretations, since we are not sure that 
there is a conflict. Crisis is not definable as dispute 
between two clearly identifiable opponents--it is a lack of 
definition and clarity which represents the crisis. Crisis 
does not begin when problems receive more precise 
definition, but rather when such definition is lacking. 
Blumenberg speaks of the context of crisis in terms of 
a "latitude in variation": 
To speak, in the history of science, of a 
"latitude" for possible changes means to determine 
the breadth of variation within which certain 
theoretical actions are possible and others are 
excluded. The narrowness or broadness of this 
enclave of the possible inside the occupied 
territory of supposed necessities, with the 
restraint or the freedom that it imposes on or 
grants to intellectual motions, is determined by 
the stability or instability of the system of 
world-explanation in which it inheres. (my stress) 
(132) 
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To link this up with the idea of a text's effects, we can 
say that the conditions of the possibility of a classic or 
revolutionary text opening up the future (and the past) 
consist of the stability or instability of the system within 
which variations are tolerated. It is here that Blumenberg 
finds some common ground with Kuhn. 
The theory of 'scientific revolutions' describes, 
for the most part correctly, the breakdown of 
dominant systems as a result of their immanent 
rigorism, the 'pedantic' disposition of every 
schoollike mode of thought, which leads with 
fateful inevitability to the self-uncovering of 
the marginal inconsistencies from which doubt and 
opposition break into the consolidated field. 
(Blumenberg, 1983:467). 
It is not just the weaknesses identifiable within a theory 
which constitute the latitude of variation possible, but 
also the possibility of opening new questions about the 
strengths of the theory. But this possibility of calling 
the strengths of the theory into question is not one which 
only an opponent of the theory would exploit. This 
possibility is also--even first--exploited by defenders of 
the theory--perhaps especially when the weaknesses of the 
theory have been revealed. Opening new questions about the 
strength of the theory--the possibilities of its 
applications--can for a considerable length of time be a 
common aim of both "dogmatists" and 11 critics. 11 Both 
dogmatists and revolutionaries open new questions about the 
strength of the theory. Both must expect the theory to be 
capable of such applications, of such extensions, if these 
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questions are to be truly motivated (i.e., asked in good 
faith)--it is not always easy, or at all times possible, to 
distinguish the dogmatist from the revolutionary, a defender 
from an attacker. 17 
The concept of U1Pbesetzung, then, is deployed by 
Blumenberg to account for the burdens we accept and the 
strategies we employ as participants in inquiry. 
Specifically, as such participants we seem required to 
assess what it is we are capable of answering, and what it 
is that we must answer. Plutarch related the warning that 
we should not be hasty to destroy what we may not be capable 
of replacing or improving upon. The thrust of this warning 
is that we should not expose, or re-expose, ourselves to 
demands or needs that have been satisfied. On the other 
hand, the status of these needs need not be guaranteed 
simply because they have been satisfied. It is possible 
that they were satisif ied only because there was no reason 
that they not be satisfied. We are all familiar with the 
political quip that some things are done only because they 
can be done. Blumenberg makes the point that some questions 
are introduced because there is no reason that they should 
not be answered. 
The difficulty we face is in distinguishing such 
questions from those which raise questions of real need. 
17 In Part IV of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 
Blumenberg presents a detailed analysis of Nicholas of Cusa 
and Giordano Bruno as cases in point. 
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Blumenberg does not so much settle these standards as point 
out how certain questions are provoked. But in this case 
too the extremes of an intolerant dogmatism and enthusiasm 
are, as Popper pointed out, to be avoided: the first 
because it believes it to be its good fortune that it can at 
least answer the questions it must, the second because it 
believes it must answer the questions it can. When stated 
like this, the modern age does seem to have a closer 
relationship with "enthusiasm" than it does to dogmatism. 18 
The advantage of describing ourselves as situated best when 
we can avoid both of these extremes is that it allows us to 
recognize and face the revolutionary's dilemma head on: the 
conjecture of new ideas requires rebellion, but this seems 
to require that we simultaneously restrain the rebellion of 
others--a rebellion which may too easily destroy that which 
it cannot replace. 19 Revolution, therefore, issues 
"reproaches" both forward and backward, and may justifiably 
fear nothing more than an enthusiastic reception of its 
18 Blumenberg spends much the entirety of Part Three 
of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age--"The Trial of 
Theoretical Curiosity"--making a similar point. We might 
say that insofar as curiosity has been rehabilitated by 
modernity, it opens the way for the possibility of 
revolution. At the same time, its position within the 
medieval schema as a vice--as a concern with the 
superfluous, with things unnecessary for salvation--is 
reoccupied by "enthusiasm." 
19 This point also invites comparison with Arendt's 
On Revolution, for she also points out the revolutionary's 
need for authority. 
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activities. 20 Dogmatism and revolution, insofar as they do 
avoid the extremes, seek to hear what is strongest in the 
other: The demands of authority are less problematic for 
dogmatism than is the demand for openness--but openness .is. a 
problem for it. On the other hand, the demand for openness 
is less problematic for the revolutionary than is the demand 
of authority--but authority is a problem for it as well. 
This underscores the relationship between Blumenberg's 
analysis of reoccupation and his emphasis on pre-history. 
Reoccupation highlights not only the ways that ideas 
function as answers to questions, but also much of the 
"novelty" of ideas that is traceable to such functions. For 
instance, Blumenberg seeks to understand how it is that a 
particular idea or theory seems to function successfully as 
an answer at one time but not at another--in other words, 
how it is thrust into the spotlight at one time, yet 
relatively neglected at other times. 21 Blumenberg is not 
denying that such theories are always "available," but he is 
20 Stanley Cavell makes a similar point with respect 
to an audience's response to a text. Rather than use the 
terms dogmatism, revolution, and enthusiasm, as I have done 
here, Cavell distinguishes between readers with whom the 
text is "genial" and those who are the text's "feared" 
readers, for whom it sets up reproaches against their 
approach (Cavell 1989:11-12). 
21 I interpret Blumenberg's article, "On a Lineage of 
the Idea of Progress" (1974)--together with his claim, in 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, to the effect that the 
idea of "progress" was placed into service as an answer to 
the question of the totality of history--to be undertaking 
this kind of investigation. 
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denying that we can answer the question concerning the 
"rise" of a theory to prominence by simply tracing a 
"substantive progression" (or self-activating tradition) in 
a direct line from its earliest formulations and forerunners 
to the "mature" product. 22 Instead, Blumenberg suggests 
that a theory comes to prominence only when it can function 
as answer--much like Kuhn's exemplary problem solution--to a 
variety of questions (within a network of questions which it 
has, to some extent, extended) . In other words, we should 
not be fooled into thinking that the power of a theory 
resides simply in the directness of its claims, as a direct 
response to an immediate and identifiable problem in the 
field. Nor should we try to give account of the strength of 
these claims by tracing their "development" over many 
generations until they have been honed into the instrument 
they now are. Rather, for Blumenberg the power of a theory 
is its power of reoccupation--its ability to undergo the 
kind of reshuffling that allows one to see it as serving in 
hitherto unrequired capacities--but unrequired only because 
these had been previously satisfied by other means. 
Summary 
Blumenberg makes the claim that the questions which a 
text opens behind itself are those which unsettle answers, 
22 Blumenberg's point might be fruitfully compared to 
Steve Fuller's critique of narrative progressions (1991). 
In this regard, see the comments made in Ingram (1993:30-1), 
and Ingram (1994) . 
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such that these answers can be understood as directed (or be 
free to be directed) to the determination of other 
questions. These answers, in other words, are directed to 
different matters than those to which we had understood them 
to be directed. At the same time, the questions to which we 
believed these answers had responded now require a new 
answer--a new determination--which is part of what we 
understand the text as attempting to offer (another part 
being its answers to questions which are pressing--which 
have not received a solution) . The importance of opening 
questions both before and behind itself, therefore, is that 
the text's novelty cannot be understood as a disposition 
that is pointed only forward. Instead, the disposition of 
the text toward closing the gap between the determinate 
questions to which it has responded and the indeterminacy of 
expectations for which it has offered some determination is 
one which opens questions in both directions: it sheds new 
light on the past and past texts, and raises new questions 
concerning these, as well as opens new questions which point 
forward. 
A classic text, then, is not defined as a text that 
deals with eternally unsettled questions or pressing 
problems--a canon of great questions. A classic text is one 
which both broadens our concerns by opening questions that 
lead into the past--and into "tradition"--and also opens 
questions that reorient our present concerns. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The argument of this paper has been that Hans 
Blumenberg's model of the logic of question and answer 
provides a better solution to the problem of the 
complementarity of dogmatism and criticism, raised by Kuhn, 
than do the alternatives offered by Popper and Gadamer. 
Gadamer's solution to this complementarity ends up 
accomodating both dogmatism and criticism as aspects of a 
dialogue (experience} that takes place within, and reforms 
(re-confirms} the framework of tradition. Popper's solution 
to the complementarity ends up accomodating dogmatism and 
criticism as aspects of a dialogue which perpetually breaks 
free from that framework. If the problem with Gadamer's 
solution is that it threatens to suppress the emancipatory 
possibilities offered by revolution, and thereby makes us 
ideological supporters of tradition, then the problem with 
Popper's solution is that its affirmation of revolutions in 
permanance threatens to undercut the requisite continuity 
and confirmation (reception of authority and reception by 
authority} necessary to keep revolutions from being reduced 
to a mere succession of self-cancelling, mutually impotent, 
episodes. In other words, the transfer of power and 
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authority necessary to sustain revolution cannot occur 
unless, and until, the determination of "where the real 
power of our previous theories lies" is made. But an 
attitude of per_petual framework-breaking all-too-easily 
overlooks and dispenses with the positive, enabling 
conditions of our frameworks, and thereby undermines an 
important component necessary for the deployment of the idea 
of progress. In short, Gadamer tips the balance of the 
complementarity toward tradition, and Popper tips it toward 
revolution. 
In this conclusion, I will make a brief attempt to make 
clearer how Blumenberg and Kuhn keep the balance from 
permanently tipping to one side or the other. Furthermore, 
I will attempt to state more explicitly not only the 
parallels between Kuhn's and Blumenberg's positions, but the 
developments for our understanding of the ideas of progress 
and revolution which result from their interaction. 
The "essential tension," so dubbed by Kuhn, between 
dogmatism and criticism, tradition and revolution, can be a 
rather unhappy mix. Blumenberg, no less than the others 
considered in this paper, recognizes this. I have called 
attention to Blumenberg's misreading of Kuhn's understanding 
of scientific revolutions at various points in this paper. 
I want to renew their dialogue here--and at the same time 
focus on Blumenberg's understanding of the essential 
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tension--by citing the claim made by Blumenberg just before 
he offers his critique of Kuhn. 
In the progress of a science, the same thing takes 
place--in exemplary fashion, almost as though in a 
test tube, with greater clarity--that in more 
diffuse manifestations keeps the general 
historical process in motion: An established 
system produces for itself the instruments with 
which to secure itself thoroughly and to extend 
the sphere of objects that it comprehends, and in 
the process continually refines the forms in which 
it is justified and applied, with the result that 
in this way the system itself brings to light and 
accentuates the data that go beyond what it is 
able to master and to enclose within the 
prescribed frame of the accepted assumptions. 
This is the description of a logical situation 
that Aristotle had already put under the heading 
of aporia [difficulty of passage. lack of 
resources] and that Kant had discussed as the 
fundamental "transcendental dialectic." In both 
cases the process of cognition itself forces the 
abandonment of its presuppositions and the 
introduction of new elementary assumptions, which, 
while they do remove the situation from which 
there was no way out. do not require the 
shattering of the identity of the overall movement 
that gave rise to the situation. (Blumenberg 
1983 :465) (my emphasis) 
I will now offset this passage with two taken from Kuhn. 
The early attacks upon the resistant problem will 
have followed the paradigm rules quite closely. 
But with continuing resistance, more and more of 
the attacks upon it will have involved some minor 
or not so minor articulation of the paradigm, no 
two of them quite alike, each partially 
successful, but none sufficiently so to be 
accepted as paradigm by the group. Through this 
proliferation of divergent articulations (more and 
more frequently they will come to be described as 
ad hoc adjustments), the rules of normal science 
become increasingly blurred. Though there still 
is a paradigm. few practitioners prove to be 
entirely agreed about what it is. Even formerly 
standard solutions of solved problems are called 
into question. 
When acute. this situation is sometimes recognized 
by the scientists involved. (Kuhn 1970: 83) (my 
emphasis) 
In the sciences .... new approaches do not 
ordinarily emerge simply when old ones stagnate, 
cease to produce novelty. Instead, they await a 
time when the traditional approach is seen to have 
failed in resolving problems acknowledged to lie 
within its competence. (Kuhn 1980:190) (my 
emphasis) 
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Given the expositions of Blumenberg's and Kuhn's positions 
throughout this paper as a backdrop, if one were to compare 
the highlighted portions of these passages to one another 
one would uncover a significant complementarity in their 
respective understandings of the dynamics of the "essential 
tension." 
For both Blumenberg and Kuhn, aporia (defined as 
difficulty of passage, or lack of resources) ultimately 
motivates scientific revolutions. However, as Blumenberg 
suggests, although a "way out" is required, that way out 
does not require the shattering of the identity of the 
dynamic that gave rise to the aporetic situation. Were we 
to place this claim within the context of Kuhn's connnent 
that the "acuteness" of the aporetic situation is only 
sometimes recognized, then I would suggest that for both 
Blumenberg and Kuhn revolutions are often "invisible" for 
the following reason: New determinations of a question by 
means of a novel (revolutionary) answer often conceal the 
fact that such answers occupy old question positions. For 
both Blumenberg and Kuhn, successful revolutions are often 
invisible because they are not intentionally undertaken by 
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agents following the demand of an imperative for revolutions 
in permanence. Revolutions, for Kuhn and Blumenberg, are 
not simply the imposition and expansion of a new framework 
of questions in place of the old framework--they are not 
framework-leaping or framework-breaking events. Instead, 
revolutions succeed when they reoccupy the positions of the 
old framework. 1 Blumenberg's fundamental criticism of 
Gadamer is that tradition is not re-confirmed, but re-
occupied. Finally, because such reoccupation is concealed, 
progress begins to look like either a simple accumulation 
(or addition) of answers and problems (which overlooks 
precisely how such answers may actually reoccupy old 
question positions), or radical framework-breaking--by which 
we always move into "roomier" frameworks, as Popper says. 
For Blumenberg and Kuhn, the idea of progress can still be 
deployed, though it means something very different from 
either of these two alternatives: reoccupation of the 
framework of question positions, not its confirmation, 
satisfies the conditions of continuity against which 
progress (unblocking the way) can be identified. 
1 Revolutions do, of course, introduce additional 
questions which "extend" the framework. 
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